Occupation zones in Austria (1945).
|Political structure||Military occupation|
|-||British zone||Gen. McCreery|
|-||French zone||Lt. Gen. Béthouart|
|-||American zone||Gen. Clark|
|-||Soviet zone||Marshal Konev|
|Historical era||Cold War|
|-||Capture of Vienna||13 April 1945|
|-||Established||27 April 1945|
|-||Austrian State Treaty||27 July 1955|
|-||Declaration of Neutrality||26 October 1955|
The Allied occupation of Austria lasted from 1945 to 1955. Austria had been regarded by Nazi Germany as a constituent part of the German state, but in 1943 the Allied powers agreed in the Declaration of Moscow that it would be regarded as the first victim of Nazi aggression, and treated as a liberated and independent country after the war.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, Austria, like Germany, was divided into four occupation zones and jointly occupied by the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France. Vienna, like Berlin, was similarly subdivided but the central district was administered jointly by the Allied Control Council.
Whereas Germany was divided into East and West Germany in 1949, Austria remained under joint occupation until 1955; its status became a controversial subject in the Cold War until the warming of relations known as the Khrushchev Thaw. After Austrian promises of perpetual neutrality, Austria was accorded full independence on 12 May 1955 and the last occupation troops left on 25 October that year.
On 29 March 1945 the Soviet commander Fyodor Tolbukhin's troops crossed the former Austrian border at Klostermarienberg in Burgenland.1 On 3 April, at the beginning of the Vienna Offensive, the Austrian politician Karl Renner, then living in southern Lower Austria, established contact with the Soviets. Joseph Stalin had already assembled a future puppet government of Austrian communists in exile, but Tolbukhin's telegram changed Stalin's mind in favor of Renner.2
On 20 April 1945, the Soviets, without asking their Western allies,3 instructed Renner to form the provisional government. Seven days later Renner's cabinet took office, declared the independence of Austria from Nazi Germany and called for the creation of a democratic state along the lines of the First Republic.3 Soviet acceptance of Renner was not an isolated episode; their officers re-established district administrations and appointed local mayors, frequently following the advice of the locals, even before the battle was over.4
Renner and his ministers were guarded and watched by NKVD bodyguards.5 One-third of State Chancellor Renner's cabinet, including crucial seats of the Secretary of State for the Interior and the Secretary of State for Education, was staffed by Austrian Communists.3 The Western allies suspected the usual Soviet pattern of setting up puppet states and did not recognize Renner.3 The British were particularly hostile;3 even Harry Truman, who believed that Renner was a trustworthy politician rather than a token front for the Kremlin, denied him recognition.6 But Renner had secured inter-party control by designating two Under-Secretaries of State in each of the ministries, appointed by the two parties not placing the Secretary of State.
As soon as Hitler's armies were pushed back into Germany, the Red Army and the NKVD began to comb the captured territories. By 23 May they reported arrests of 268 former Red Army men, 1,208 Wehrmacht men and 1,655 civilians.7 In the following weeks the British surrendered over 40,000 Cossacks who had fled to Western Austria to the Soviet authorities and certain death.8 In July and August, the Soviets brought in four regiments of NKVD troops to "mop up" Vienna and seal the Czechoslovak border.910
The Red Army lost 17,000 lives in the Battle of Vienna. But the reputation of the Soviet soldiers was immediately ruined by the vast amount of sexual violence against women, which occurred in the first days and weeks after the Soviet victory. Repressions against civilians harmed Red Army reputation to such an extent that on 28 September, 1945 Moscow issued an order forbidding violent interrogations.11 Red Army morale fell as soldiers prepared to be sent home; replacement of combat units with Ivan Konev's permanent occupation force only marginally improved the Austrians' suffering.12 Throughout 1945 and 1946, all levels of Soviet command tried, in vain, to contain desertion and plunder by rank and file.1314 According to Austrian police records for 1946, "men in Soviet uniform", usually drunk, accounted for more than 90% of registered crime (American soldiers: 5 to 7%).1516 At the same time, the Soviet governors resisted the expansion and arming of the Austrian police force.17
French troops crossed the Austrian border on 29 April, followed by the Americans and finally the British on 8 May.1 Until the end of July 1945 none of the Western allies had first-hand intelligence from Eastern Austria (likewise, Renner's cabinet knew practically nothing about conditions in the West18).
On 9 July 1945 the Allies agreed on the borders of their occupation zones.18 Vorarlberg and North Tyrol were assigned to the French Zone; Salzburg and Upper Austria south of the Danube to the American Zone; East Tyrol, Carinthia and Styria to the British Zone; and Burgenland, Lower Austria, and the Mühlviertel area of Upper Austria, north of the Danube, to the Soviet Zone. The French and American zones bordered those countries' zones in Germany, and the Soviet zone bordered future Warsaw Pact states. Vienna was divided among all four Allies. The historical center of Vienna was declared an international zone, in which occupation forces changed every month. Movement of occupation troops ("zone swap") continued until the end of July.18
The first Americans arrived in Vienna in the end of July 1945,6 when the Soviets were pressing Renner to surrender Austrian oil fields.19 Americans objected and blocked the deal19 but ultimately the Soviets assumed control over Austrian oil in their zone. The British arrived only in September. The Allied Council of four military governors20 convened for its first meeting in Vienna on 12 September, 1945. It refused to recognize Renner's claim of a national government but did not prevent him from extending influence into the Western zones. Renner appointed vocal anti-communist Karl Gruber as Foreign Minister and tried to reduce Communist influence. On 20 October, 1945, Renner's reformed cabinet was recognized by the Western allies and received a go-ahead for the first legislative election.21
The election held on 25 November 1945 was a blow for the Communist Party of Austria which received less than 5% of the vote. The coalition of Christian Democrats (ÖVP) and Social Democrats (SPÖ),22 backed by 90% of the votes, assumed control over the cabinet and offered the position of Federal Chancellor to Christian Democrat Julius Raab.23 The Soviets vetoed Raab,23 due to his political role in the 1930s. Instead President Karl Renner, with the consent of parliament, appointed Leopold Figl, who was just barely acceptable to the Soviets.21 They responded with massive and coordinated expropriation of Austrian economic potential.21
The Potsdam Agreement allowed confiscation of "German external assets" in Austria, and the Soviets used the vagueness of this definition to the full.24 In less than a year they dismantled and shipped to the East industrial equipment valued at around US$500 million.6 American High Commissioner Mark W. Clark vocally resisted Soviet expansionist intentions, and his reports to Washington, along with George F. Kennan's The Long Telegram, supported Truman's tough stance against the Soviets.25 Thus, according to Bischof, the Cold War in Austria began in the spring of 1946, one year before the outbreak of the global Cold War.19
On 28 June, 1946, the Allies signed the Second Control Agreement, that loosening their dominance over the Austrian government. The Parliament was de facto relieved of Allied control. From now on its decision could be overturned only by unanimous vote by all four Allies.26 Soviet vetoes were routinely voided by the Western opposition.26 For the next nine years the country was gradually emancipated from foreign control, and evolved from a "nation under tutelage" to full independence.27 The government possessed its own independent vision of the future, reacting to adverse circumstances and at times turning them to their own benefit.28 First allied talks on Austrian independence were held in January 1947, and deadlocked over the issue of "German assets" in Soviet possession.29
|Part of a series on the|
|History of Austria|
|World War I|
|World War II|
In late 1945 and early 1946 the Allied occupation force peaked at around 150,000 Soviet, 55,000 British, 40,000 American and 15,000 French troops.30 The costs of keeping these troops were levied on the Austrian government. At first, Austria had to pay the whole occupation bill; in 1946 occupation costs were capped at 35% of Austrian state expenditures, equally split between the Soviets and the Western allies.30
Coincidentally with the Second Control Agreement, the Soviets changed their economic policy from outright plunder to running expropriated Austrian businesses for a profit. Austrian communists advised Stalin to nationalize the whole economy, but he deemed the proposal to be too radical.2 Between February and June 1946, the Soviets expropriated hundreds of businesses left in their zone.19 On 27 June, 1946, they amalgamated these assets into the USIA, a conglomerate of over 400 enterprises.31 It controlled not more than 5% of Austrian economic output but possessed a substantial, or even monopolistic, share in glass, steel, oil and transportation industries.32 The USIA was weakly integrated with the rest of Austrian economy: its products were primarily shipped to the East, its profits de facto confiscated and its taxes left unpaid by the Soviets. The Austrian government refused to recognize USIA legal title over its possessions; in retaliation, the USIA refused to pay Austrian taxes and tariffs.33 This competitive advantage helped to keep USIA enterprises afloat despite their mounting obsolescence. The Soviets had no intention to reinvest their profits, and USIA assets gradually decayed and lost their competitive edge.34 The Austrian government feared paramilitary communist gangs sheltered by the USIA35 and scorned it for being "an economy of exploitation in colonial style."36 The economy of the Soviet zone eventually reunited with the rest of the country.
South Tyrol, a disputed territory in the Alps, was returned to Italy. The "thirty-second decision" of the Council of Foreign Ministers to grant South Tyrol to Italy (4 September, 1945) disregarded popular opinion in Austria and the possible effects of a forced repatriation of 200,000 German-speaking Tyroleans.37 The decision was motivated largely by the British desire to reward Italy, a country far more important for the containment of world communism. Renner's objections came in too late and carried too little weight to have effect.38 Popular and official protests continued through 1946. The signatures of 150,000 South Tyroleans did not alter the decision.39 South Tyrol is today an Italian autonomous province (Bolzano/Bozen) with a German-speaking majority.
In 1947, the Austrian economy, including USIA enterprises, reached 61% of pre-war level, but it was disproportionately weak in consumer goods production (42% of pre-war level).40 Food remained the worst problem. The country, according to American reports, survived 1945 and 1946 on "a near-starvation diet" with daily rations remaining below 2000 calories until the end of 1947.41 65% of Austrian agricultural output and nearly all oil was concentrated in the Soviet zone, complicating the Western Allies' task of feeding the population in their own zones.42
From March 1946 to June 1947, 64% of these rations were provided by the UNRRA.43 Heating depended on supplies of German coal shipped by the U.S. on lax credit terms.44 Drought of 1946 further depressed farm output and hydroelectric power generation. Figl's government, the Chambers of Labor, Trade and Agriculture, and the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) temporarily resolved the crisis in favor of tight regulation of food and labor markets. Wage increases were limited and locked to commodity prices through annual price-wage agreements. The negotiations set a model of building consensus between elected and non-elected political elites that became the basis of post-war Austrian democracy,45 known as Austrian Social Partnership and Austro-corporatism.46
The severe winter of 1946–1947 was followed by the disastrous summer of 1947, when the potato harvest barely made 30% of pre-war output.43 Food shortages of 1947 were aggravated by the withdrawal of UNRRA aid, spiraling inflation and the demoralizing failure of State Treaty talks.43 In April 1947, the government was unable to distribute any rations, and on 5 May Vienna was shaken by a violent food riot.47 Unlike earlier popular protests, the demonstrators, led by the Communists, called to curb the westernization of Austrian politics.48 In August, a food riot in Bad Ischl turned into a pogrom of local Jews.49 In November, food shortage sparked workers' strikes in British-occupied Styria.48 Figl's government declared that the food riots were a failed communist putsch, although later historians said this was an exaggeration.2948
In June 1947, the month when the UNRRA stopped shipments of food to Austria, the extent of the food crisis compelled the U.S. government to issue $300 million in food aid. In the same month Austria was invited to discuss its participation in the Marshall Plan.50 Direct aid and subsidies helped Austria to survive the hunger of 1947. On the other hand, they depressed food prices and thus discouraged local farmers, delaying the rebirth of Austrian agriculture.43
Austria finalized its Marshall Plan program in the end of 1947 and received the first tranche of Marshall Plan aid in March 1948.51 Heavy industry (or what was left of it) was concentrated around Linz, in the American zone, and in British-occupied Styria. Their products were in high demand in post-war Europe. Naturally, the administrators of the Marshall Plan channeled available financial aid into heavy industry controlled by the American and British forces.52 American military and political leaders made no secret of their intentions: Geoffrey Keyes said that "we cannot afford to let this key area (Austria) fall under exclusive influence of the Soviet Union."53 The Marshall Plan was deployed primarily against the Soviet zone but it was not completely excluded: it received 8% of Marshall plan investments (compared to 25% of food and other physical commodities).54 The Austrian government regarded financial aid to the Soviet zone as a lifeline holding the country together. This was the only case when Marshall Plan funds were distributed in Soviet-occupied territories.55
The Marshall Plan was not universally popular, especially in its initial phase.56 It benefited some trades such as metallurgy but depressed others such as agriculture. Heavy industries quickly recovered, from 74.7% of pre-war output in 1948 to 150.7% in 1951.57 American planners deliberately neglected consumer goods industries, construction trades and small business. Their workers, almost half of the industrial workforce, suffered from rising unemployment.58 In 1948–1949, a substantial share of Marshall Plan funds was used to subsidize imports of food. American money effectively raised real wages: the grain price was about one-third of the world price, while agriculture remained in ruins.59 Marshall Plan aid gradually removed many of the causes of popular unrest that shook the country in 1947,60 but Austria remained dependent on food imports.
The second stage of the Marshall Plan, which began in 1950, concentrated on productivity of the economy.61 According to Michael J. Hogan, "in the most profound sense, it involved the transfer of attitudes, habits and values as well, indeed a whole way of life that Marshall planners associated with progress in the marketplace of politics and social relationships as much as they did with industry and agriculture."62 The program, as instructed by American lawmakers,63 targeted improvement in factory-level productivity, labor-management relations, free trade unions and introduction of modern business practices.64 The Economic Cooperation Administration, which operated until December 1951, distributed around $300 million in technical assistance and attempted steering the Austrian social partnership (political parties, labor unions, business associations and executive government) in favor of productivity and growth instead of redistribution and consumption.65
Their efforts were thwarted by the Austrian practice of making decisions behind closed doors.66 The Americans struggled to change it in favor of open, public discussion. They took a strong anti-cartel stance, appreciated by the Socialists, and pressed the government to remove anti-competition legislation.67 But ultimately they were responsible for the creation of the vast monopolistic public sector of the economy (and thus politically benefiting the Socialists).68
According to Bischof, "no European nation benefited more from Marshall Plan than Austria."69 Austria received nearly a $1 billion through Marshall Plan, and half a billion in humanitarian aid.3070 The Americans also refunded all occupation costs charged in 1945–1946, around $300 million.71 In 1948–1949 Marshall Plan aid contributed 14% of national income, the highest ratio of all involved countries.72 Per capita, aid amounted to $132 compared to $19 for the Germans.30 But Austria also paid more war reparations per capita than any other Axis state or territory.73 Total war reparations taken by the Soviet Union including withdrawn USIA profits, looted property and the final settlement agreed in 1955, are estimated between $1.54 billion and $2.65 billion73 (Eisterer: 2 to 2.5 billion).74
The British had been quietly arming gendarmes since 1945 and discussed the creation of a proper Austrian military in 1947.75 The Americans feared that Vienna could be the scene of another Berlin Blockade. They set up and filled emergency food dumps, and prepared to airlift supplies to Vienna76 while the government created a backup base in Salzburg.77 The American command secretly trained the soldiers of an underground Austrian military at a rate of 200 men a week.78 The Gendarmerie knowingly hired Wehrmacht veterans and VdU members;79 the denazification of Austria's 537,000 registered Nazis had largely ended in 1948.80
Austrian communists appealed to Stalin to partition their country along the German model, but in February 1948 Andrei Zhdanov vetoed the idea:2 Austria had more value as a bargaining chip than as another unstable client state. The continuing talks on Austrian independence stalled in 1948 but progressed to a "near breakthrough" in 1949: the Soviets lifted most of their objections, and the Americans suspected foul play.81 The Pentagon was convinced that the withdrawal of Western troops would leave the country open to Soviet invasion of the Czech model. Clark insisted that before their departure the United States must secretly train and arm the core of a future military. Serious secret training of the B-Gendarmerie began in 195077 but soon stalled due to US defense budget cuts in 1951.82 Gendarmes were trained primarily as an anti-coup police force, but they also studied Soviet combat practice and counted on cooperation with the Yugoslavs in case of a Soviet invasion.79
Although in the fall of 1950 the Western powers replaced their military representatives with civilian diplomats,26 strategically, the situation became gloomier than ever. The Korean War experience persuaded Washington that Austria might become "Europe's Korea"77 and sped up rearmament of the "secret ally".83 International tension was coincident with a severe internal economic and social crisis. The planned withdrawal of American food subsidies spelled a sharp drop in real wages. The government and the unions deadlocked in negotiations, and gave the communists the opportunity to organize the 1950 Austrian general strikes which became the gravest threat since the 1947 food riots.84 The communists stormed and took over ÖGB offices and disrupted railroad traffic but failed to recruit sufficient public support and had to admit defeat.85 The Soviets and the Western allies did not dare to actively intervene in the strikes.86 The strike intensified the militarization of Western Austria, with active input from France and the CIA.77 Despite the strain of the Korean War, by the end of 1952 the American "Stockpile A" (A for Austria) in France and Germany amassed 227 thousand tons of materiel earmarked for Austrian armed forces.87
The end of the Korean War and the death of Joseph Stalin defused the standoff, and the country was rapidly, but not completely, demilitarized. After the Soviet Union had relieved Austria of the need to pay for the cost of their reduced army of 40,000 men,71 the British and French followed suit and reduced their forces to a token presence.88 Finally, the Soviets replaced their military governor with a civilian ambassador. The former border between Eastern and Western Austria became a demarcation line.71
Chancellor Julius Raab, elected in April 1953, removed pro-Western foreign minister Gruber and steered Austria to a more neutral policy.89 Raab carefully probed the Soviets about resuming the talks on independence,90 but until February 1955 it remained contingent on a solution to the larger German problem. The Western strategy of rearming West Germany, formulated in the Paris Agreement, was unacceptable to the Soviets. They responded with a counter-proposal for a pan-European security system that, they said, could speed up reunification of Germany, and again the West suspected foul play.91 Eisenhower, in particular, had "an utter lack of confidence in the reliability and integrity of the men in the Kremlin... the Kremlin is pre-empting the right to speak for the small nations of the world".92
In January 1955, Soviet diplomats Andrey Gromyko, Vladimir Semenov and Georgy Pushkin secretly advised Vyacheslav Molotov to unlink the Austrian and German issues, expecting that the new talks on Austria would delay ratification of the Paris Agreement.93 Molotov publicly announced the new Soviet initiative on 8 February. He put forward three conditions for Austrian independence: neutrality, no foreign military bases, and guarantees against a new Anschluss.9394
In March, Molotov clarified his plan through a series of consultations with ambassador Norbert Bischoff: Austria was no longer a hostage of the German issue.93 Molotov invited Raab to Moscow for bilateral negotiations that, if successful, had to be followed by a Four Powers conference. By this time Paris Agreements were ratified by France and Germany, although the British and Americans suspected a trap95 of the same sort that Hitler had set for Schuschnigg in 1938.96 Anthony Eden and others wrote that the Moscow initiative was merely a cover-up for another incursion into German matters.97 The West erroneously thought that the Soviets valued Austria primarily as a military asset, when in reality it was a purely political issue.98 Austria's military significance has been largely devalued by the end of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict and the upcoming signing of the Warsaw Pact.99
These fears did not materialize, and Raab's visit to Moscow (12–15 April) was a breakthrough. Moscow agreed that Austria would be free not later than 31 December.100101 Austrians agreed to pay for the "German assets" and oil fields left by the Soviets, mostly in kind;102103 "the real prize was to be neutrality on the Swiss model."100104 Molotov also promised release and repatriation of Austrians imprisoned in the Soviet Union.93
Western powers were stunned; Wallinger reported to London that the deal "was far too good to be true, to be honest".100 But it proceeded as had been agreed in Moscow and on 15 May 1955 Antoine Pinay, Harold MacMillan, Molotov, John Foster Dulles and Figl signed the Austrian State Treaty. It came into force on 27 July and on 25 October the country was free of occupying troops.105 The Soviets left to the new government a symbolic cache of small arms, artillery and T-34 tanks; the Americans left a far greater gift of "Stockpile A" assets.106 The only person upset about the outcome was Konrad Adenauer, who called the affair "die ganze Österreichische Schweinerei" ("the whole Austrian scandal") and threatened the Austrians with "sending Hitler's remains home to Austria".105
- Aftermath of World War II
- Allied-occupied Germany
- American food policy in occupied Germany
- Soviet occupations
- The Third Man
- Eisterer 2009, p. 190.
- Bordjugov 2005.
- Bischof 2009, p. 174.
- Eisterer 2009, p. 196.
- Petrov 2009, p. 259.
- Bischof 2009, p. 175.
- Petrov 2009, p. 260.
- Petrov 2009, p. 263.
- Petrov 2009, pp. 252–253.
- Petrov 2009, p. 255, provides a roll of NKVD troops stationed in Austria.
- Petrov 2009, p. 258.
- Eisterer, p. 194.
- Petrov 2009, pp. 266–268.
- Lewis, pp. 145, 153, wrote that Tolbukhin "was reported to have been relieved of his command in the summer of 1945 because of the behavior of his troops."
- Berg 2000, p. 162.
- Berg 2000, pp. 161–162, reviews the studies and sources on alcoholism in Soviet troops.
- Carafano 2002, p. 177.
- Eisterer 2009, p. 197.
- Bischof 2009, p. 177.
- Antoine Béthouart (France), Richard McCreery (UK), Mark W. Clark (US) and Ivan Konev (USSR) – Eisterer 2009, p. 197.
- Bischof 2009, p. 176.
- The coalition of ÖVP and SPÖ has been since known as the Grand Coalition – Wilsford, p. 378 or, alternatively, the Great Coalition – Wollinetz, p. 93.
- Wollinetz 1988, p. 94.
- Bischof 2009, pp. 176–177.
- Bischof 2009, pp. 177–178.
- Bischof 2009, p. 172.
- Bischof 2009, p. 173.
- Lewis 2000, p. 139.
- Bischof 2009, p. 178.
- Eisterer 2009, p. 201.
- Fraberger, Stiefel 2000, p. 75
- Fraberger, Stiefel 2000, p. 76.
- Fraberger, Stiefel 2000, pp. 76–77.
- Fraberger, Stiefel 2000, p. 80; Komlosy 2000, p. 124.
- Lewis 2000, p. 146.
- Fraberger, Stiefel 2000, p. 77.
- Steininger 2003, pp. 79–80.
- Steininger 2003, pp. 81–82.
- Steininger 2003, p. 83.
- Lewis 2000, pp. 141–142, used 1937 as a base year, and wrote that "1937 itself was a poor year".
- Lewis 2000, p. 142.
- Bailey, p. 148, wrote "65% of pre-war yield", not actual post-war output.
- Lewis 2000, p. 143.
- Gimbel 1976, p. 163.
- Lewis 2000, p. 149.
- For a review of evolution of Austrian Social Partnership see Bischof et al. 1996.
- Lewis 2000, p. 147.
- Lewis 2000, p. 148.
- Berg 2000, p. 165.
- Lewis 2000, p. 145.
- Lewis 2000, p. 144.
- Bader, p. 160.
- Steininger 2008, p. 77.
- Fraberger, Stiefel 2000, p. 82.
- Fraberger, Stiefel 2000, p. 83.
- Lewis 2000, p. 138.
- Bader, p. 160, uses 1937 as the base year (100%).
- Bader, pp. 160–161.
- Williams, p. 122.
- Bader, p. 157.
- Tweraser 1995, p. 93.
- As cited in Tweraser 1995, p. 93. See Hogan, p. 415 for the original text.
- Tweraser 1995, p. 96: the 1951 Benton Amendment to the Mutual Security Act required "to encourage free enterprise and trade unions and to discourage restricting trade practices."
- Tweraser 1995, p. 94.
- Tweraser 1995, pp. 92–93.
- Tweraser 1995, p. 106.
- Tweraser 1995, p. 98.
- Tweraser 1995, p. 105.
- Bischof 2009, p. 179.
- Lewis, p. 144: "962 million dollars in Marshall Aid".
- Eisterer 2009, p. 202.
- Berg, p. 169. The Netherlands and Ireland were the second and third with 10.8% and 7.8%.
- Fraberger, Stiefel 2000, p. 85.
- Eisterer 2009, p. 201: 2 to 2.5 billion U. S. dollars.
- Carafano 2002, pp. 177–178.
- Bischof 2009, pp. 181–182.
- Bischof 2009, p. 181.
- Carafano 2002, p. 180.
- Carafano 2002, pp. 185–186, 187.
- Eisterer 2009, p. 210.
- Bischof 2009, p. 180.
- Carafano 2002, p. 183.
- Steininger 2008, p. 96.
- Bader, p. 165; Williams, p. 115; Carafano 2002, pp. 196–197.
- For a detailed account of the 1950 strikes see Bader, pp. 155–180.
- Williams, p. 126.
- Carafano 2002, p. 184.
- Eisterer 2009, p. 202: UK – single battalion, France – 400 men in Vienna and "a few officers and gendarmes" in Tyrol. Carafano 2002, p. 188 – "reduced to skeletal commands."
- Carafano 2002, p. 173.
- Eisterer 2009, pp. 202–203.
- Steininger 2008, pp. 110–111.
- Steininger 2008, p. 101, cites Eisenhower's letter to Winston Churchill dated 22 July 1954. Full text in Boyle, p. 163
- Sergeev 2001.
- Steininger 2008, pp. 112–113.
- Steininger 2008, pp. 117–119.
- Steininger 2008, p. 123, refers to chancellor Schuschnigg's visit to Berchtesgaden on the eve of the Anschluss, 12 February 1938.
- Steininger 2008, p. 126.
- Carafano 2002, p. 189.
- Carafano 2002, pp. 193–194.
- Steininger 2008, p. 128.
- Molotov at first demanded six months to withdraw the troops, while Raab pressed for three months. In the end they agreed on "three months from signing the Treaty, but no later than December 31" – Kindermann 1955, p. 110.
- $150 million for German assets paid with goods, plus 10 million tons of oil and $2 million in cash – Steininger 2008, p. 128. Kremlin proposed to spread oil shipments over six years, taking 50% of Austrian output, but at the request of Austria the schedule was extended to 10 years – Sergeev.
- See Bailey, p. 163, for a contemporary Western assessment of the final settlement as "self-ransom" and "extortion".
- According to Sergeev, who was present at the negotiations, Molotov's phrase about the Swiss model was a quote from a speech delivered by John Foster Dulles in Berlin on 13 February 1954.
- Steininger 2008, p. 131.
- Carafano 2002, pp. 190–191.
- Bader, William B. (1966). Austria Between East and West. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-0258-6.
- Bailey, Thomas A. (1977). The Marshall Plan summer: an eyewitness report on Europe and the Russians in 1947. Hoover Press. ISBN 0-8179-4201-7.
- Berg, Matthew Paul (2000). Caught between Iwan and Weichnachtmann: Occupation, the Marshall Plan and Austrian Identity, in: Bischof, Gunther et al. (2000). The Marshall Plan in Austria. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 0-7658-0679-7. pp. 156–184.
- Bischof, Guenther (2009). Allied Plans and Policies for the Occupation of Austria, 1938–1955, in: Steininger, Rolf et al. (2009). Austria in the Twentieth Century. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1-4128-0854-5. pp. 162–189.
- Bischof, Guenther et al. (1996). Austro-Corporatism: Past, Present, Future. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1-56000-833-4.
- Bordjygov, Gennadij et al. (2005, in German). Sowjetische Politik in Österreich 1945–1955: Einleitung zu den Dokumenten, in: Sowjetische Politik in Österreich 1945–1955. Dokumente aus russischen Archiven. Wien: The Austrian Academy of Sciences Press. ISBN 978-3-7001-3536-4. pp. 18–30 (Russian edition).
- Boyle, Peter (1990). The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953–1955. UNC Press. ISBN 0-8078-4951-0.
- Carafano, James Jay (2002). Waltzing into the Cold War: the struggle for occupied Austria. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 1-58544-213-5.
- Eisterer, Klaus (2009). Austria under Allied Occupation, in: Steininger, Rolf et al. (2003). Austria in the Twentieth Century. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1-4128-0854-5.
- Fraberger, Ingrid; Stiefel, Dieter (2000). Enemy Images: The Meaning of Anti-Communism and its Importance for the Political and Economic Reconstruction in Austria after 1945, in: Bischof, Gunther et al. (2000). The Marshall Plan in Austria. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 0-7658-0679-7. pp. 56–97.
- Kindermann, Walter (1955). The intimate Diary of an Ausrian Interpreter at Moscow Treaty Talks.... Life (magazine), 11 July 1955 (v. 39 no. 2), pp. 108–112.
- Gimbel, John (1976). The Origins of the Marshall Plan. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-0903-3.
- Komlosy, Andrea (2000). The Marshall Plan and the Making of the Iron Curtain in Austria. in: Bischof, Gunther et al. (2000). The Marshall Plan in Austria. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 0-7658-0679-7. pp. 98–137.
- Lewis, Jill (2000). Dancing on a Tight Rope: The Beginning of the Marshall Plan, in: Bischof, Gunther et al. (2000). The Marshall Plan in Austria. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 0-7658-0679-7. pp. 138–155.
- Petrov, Nikita (2009). The Internal Troops of the NKVD in the System of Soviet Organs of Repression in Austria. 1945–1946, in: Bischof, Guenther et al. (2009). New perspectives on Austrians and World War II. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1-4128-0883-9. pp. 250–276.
- Sergeev, Rostislav (2001, in Russian). Kak byl dostignut proryv v avsriyskom voprose (Как был достигнут прорыв в австрийском вопросе). Sovremennaya Evropa 2001 no. 4.
- Steininger, Rolf (2008). Austria, Germany, and the Cold War: from the Anschluss to the State Treaty 1938–1955. Berghahn Books. ISBN 1-84545-326-3.
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