First Vienna Award
||This article has been nominated to be checked for its neutrality. (March 2009)|
The partition of Czechoslovakia. First Vienna Award in red
|Signed||November 2, 1938|
|Signatories||Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Germany and Italy|
|Parties||Hungary and Czechoslovakia|
The First Vienna Award was the result of the First Vienna Arbitration, which took place at Vienna's Belvedere Palace on November 2, 1938. The Arbitration and Award were direct consequences of the Munich Agreement (September 30, 1938). It entailed the partitioning of Czechoslovakia.
By the First Vienna Award, arbiters from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy sought a non-violent way to enforce the territorial claims of Hungary, in revision of the Treaty of Trianon of 1920. Nazi Germany was by then well into her own revision of the Versailles Treaty, with her remilitarization of the Rhineland (7 March 1936) and Anschluss of Austria (12 March 1938).
The First Vienna Award separated largely Magyar-populated territories in southern Slovakia and southern Carpathian Rus from Czechoslovakia and awarded them to Hungary. Hungary thus regained some of the territories in present-day Slovakia and Ukraine that she had lost by the Treaty of Trianon in the post-World War I dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
In mid-March 1939, Adolf Hitler gave Hungary permission to occupy the rest of Carpathian Rus, north up to the Polish border, thus creating a common Hungarian-Polish border, as had existed prior to the 18th-century Partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Before the end of the First World War and the Treaties of Trianon and Saint Germain, the Carpathian region of the former Kingdom of Hungary (Transleithania) in the Austro-Hungarian empire had bordered to the north on the province of Galicia, which had been part of the Cisleithanian part of the Dual Monarchy.
Six months after Hungary had occupied the rest of Carpathian Rus, north up to the Polish border, in September 1939, the Polish government and part of its military would escape to Hungary and Romania, and from there to France and French-mandated Syria to carry on the war against Hitler's Germany.
After World War II, the 1947 Treaty of Paris declared the Vienna Award null and void.
- 1 Situation before arbitration
- 2 Negotiations before arbitration
- 3 Arbitration
- 4 Impacts
- 5 Nullification
- 6 Post war persecutions
- 7 See also
- 8 Notes
- 9 References
- 10 Sources
- 11 External links
In 1938 Germany and Hungary focused on creation of common platform against Czechoslovakia. Since 1933 Hungarian foreign policy closely collaborated with Nazi Germany in expectation of revision of borders1 established by the peace Treaty of Trianon. In March 1933, Hungarian prime minister declares that Hungary "requests justice in the historical principle" (Hungary aspired for re-annexation of Slovakia and other territories). In June 1933, Gyula Gömbös visited Germany and together with Adolf Hitler concluded that Czechoslovakia is the main obstacle for "rearrangement" of central Europe, Czechoslovak republic should be internally disintegrated, isolated internationally and then eliminated by military power.2 Miklós Horthy during the meeting with Adolf Hitler in August 1936 evolved idea of common attack against Czechoslovakia to "remove cancer tumor from the heart of Europe".3 At the end of 1937, Hitler decided to start action against Czechoslovakia. In November 1938, he negotiated with Hungarian government where they placed importance on destiny of Czechoslovakia. 4
Even if the government of Béla Imrédy informed Germany that Hungary wants to actively participate on military attack against Czechoslovakia, they later refused to begin such actions, but radicalized their official standpoints (Hungary originally conditioned attack by international isolation of Czechoslovakia and only for the case of local conflict1). Hungarian representatives considered attack to be too dangerous and wanted to preserve relationships with France and Great Britain which conditioned their support for the problem of Hungarian minority by not engaging on German military actions.1 This outraged Adolf Hitler and led to change in German view on territorial demands of Hungary in the eastern part of Czechoslovakia.
Before Munich Agreement, Hungarian government emissary officially asked German and Italian delegation to resolve Hungarian demands together with the questions of Sudeten Germans. However, Adolf Hitler did not agree, because he was not satisfied with previous passivity of Hungary and had own plans for the central Europe. French and British delegates (Édouard Daladier and Neville Chamberlain) saw potential danger in such complex solution, but thanks to Benito Mussolini, Hungarian demands were reflected in the attachment of agreement. This attachment requested Czechoslovakia to resolve minority question with Hungary and Poland within three months through bilateral negotiations; otherwise matters would be resolved by the four signatories of the agreement.5 After annexation of Zaolzie and Český Těšín by Poland, the Hungarian question remained open. Poland later annexed further territories in northern Slovakia (on December 1, 1938, villages in Kysuce, Orava a Spiš) comprising 226 km², with 4,280 inhabitants. Hungarian government understood the attachment of Munich Agreement as an agreement of superpowers for the revision of peace treaties and emphasized that it does not mean only revision of borders based on ethnicity but it opens way for restoration of territorial integrity of Hungary before 19186 (i.e. creation of common border with Poland). Official Hungarian circles were aware that Hungary alone is too weak to enforce territorial demands towards Czechoslovakia, because they knew that any attack would encounter the resistance of Czechoslovakia's more modernly equipped army. note 1 In this situation, Hungary decided to fight with Czechoslovakia in the diplomatic field and to push for territorial revision in the spirit of Munich Agreement.7
The Munich Agreement defined three months period to resolve Hungarian demands, but Hungarian government pushed to start negotiations immediately. The pressure was increased on Hungarian side by border conflicts and by diversion actions on the Czechoslovak territory. The first conflict occurred in the early morning on October 5, 1938, when troops of Hungarian army (Magyar Királyi Honvédség) crossed border and attacked Czechoslovak positions near Jesenské8 with the goal to capture Rimavská Sobota.9 Hungarian troops withdrew after arrival of Czechoslovak reinforcements (Czechoslovaks killed 9 Hungarians soldiers and captured several prisoners). Two days later Hungarian troops tried to cross Danube near Štúrovo (Párkány), but failed again.9 Situation was worse on Carpathian Ruthenia with lower density of fortifications where paramilitary units of Rongyos Gárda infiltrated into Czechoslovak territory. The first two units of Rongyos Gárda crossed border on October 6, 1938. On October 9, 1938 they blow up the bridge over river Borozhava. Terrorist actions of Rongyos Gárda continued also during negotiations and after the First Vienna Award. During the second day of bilateral negotiations (October 10, 1938) they murdered railway officer in Borozhava and damaged railway facilities.10
Czechoslovakia had interest on stabilization of situation because foreign ministry had to resolve problems with Poland and Germany and did not want to start negotiations before October 15. Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs was focused on building new relationships with Germany and Italy to negotiate guarantees for new borders.11 After the Munich Agreement all political subjects in Slovakia concluded that it is necessary to change position of Slovakia within state and declared autonomy (October 6, 1938). New autonomous government understood definition of borders as a priority and the Slovak People's Party requested participation on negotiations.12 The central government in Prague was aware that delegation should be led by Slovak and considered Milan Hodža or Imrich Karvaš. However, after creation of autonomous government, foreign minister František Chvalkovský proposed its representatives - Jozef Tiso or Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Both politicians refused with justification that this role is in competition of the central government. When it was emphasized that it is mainly in the interest of Slovakia, they accepted.13 More, Jozef Tiso hoped that Hungarian partners accept concessions easier if they do not negotiate with representatives of the central government.14 Under pressure, threat of internal destabilization of Czechoslovakia because of diversion actions and further radicalization of situation in Hungary, Czechoslovakia agreed to begin negotiations on October 9, 19:00.
Negotiations were held between October 9 and October 13, 1938, in Komárno on the Slovak northern bank of the Danube River, just on the border with Hungary. The Czechoslovak delegation was led by Jozef Tiso (prime minister of autonomous government) without any experience with similar negotiations, and included Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Minister of Justice in the Slovak cabinet, and General Rudolf Viest. The central government of Czechoslovakia was represented by Dr. Ivan Krno, Political Director of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. Autonomous Carpathian Ruthenia was represented by Ivan Párkányi (minister without portfolio). The Czechoslovak (Slovak and Ruthenian) delegation was not completely prepared because of time pressure. On the contrary, the Hungarian delegation comprised experienced individuals11 and led by Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya and Minister of Education Pál Teleki. Hungarian government welcomed composition of Czechoslovak delegation and believed that it will be easier to influence inexperienced Slovak politicians by promises.11 This expectation was not fulfilled, more Slovak delegates also refused any possibility for return into Kingdom of Hungary.11
The Hungarian government defined strategy for negotiations - to radically demand areas where at least 50% of Hungarians lived according to census from 1910.11 This formulation was chosen with respect to signers of the Munich Agreement, however Hungary requested also areas which did not match this criteria even according to discussed Hungarian census from 1910.15 On the first day, Hungary supplied memorandum with requested territorial changes. The Hungarians further demanded a plebiscite in the remaining territory, in which Slovaks and Ruthenians would declare whether they wanted to be incorporated into Hungary.
Hungary demanded territories up to and including the line defined by Devín (Hungarian: Dévény) - Bratislava (Pozsony) - Nitra (Nyitra) - Tlmače (Garamtolmács) - Levice (Léva) - Lučenec (Losonc) - Rimavská Sobota (Rimaszombat) - Jelšava (Jolsva) - Rožňava (Rozsnyó) - Košice (Kassa) - Trebišov (Tőketerebes) - Pavlovce nad Uhom (Pálóc) - Uzhhorod (Slovak: Užhorod, Hungarian: Ungvár) - Mukacheve (Mukačevo, Munkács) - Vinogradiv (Nagyszőlős). The territory had area 14,106 km² (12,124 km² in Slovakia and 1,982 km² in Carpatian Ruthenia). It comprised from 1,346,000 of citizens (1,136,000 in Slovakia, 210,000 in Carpathian Ruthenia). According to the last census from 1930, 678,000 of them declared other than Hungarian nationality (553,000 in Slovakia, 125,000 in Carpathian Ruthenia).16
More, Hungary requested for immediate annexation of two border-crossing towns from Czechoslovakia as a "goodwill gesture". The Czechoslovak delegation agreed on the railway town of Slovenské Nové Mesto (until 1918 a suburb of the Hungarian town of Sátoraljaújhely) as well as the town of Šahy (Hungarian: Ipolyság). Both were occupied by Hungary on October 12.
The basic difference between the arguments of the two parties was that the Hungarians presented the 1910 census figures (as had Germany during the Munich Conference) while Czechoslovakia presented the latest 1930 figures and contested the validity of the 1910 census. Later it also presented figures from Hungarian censuses before 1900. The census from 1910 was unacceptable for the Czechoslovak delegation, because it represented the peak of magyarization and it differed from previous Hungarian and later Czechoslovak censuses as well as from post war censuses from other countries where Hungarian minority lived (Austria, Romania, Yugoslavia). (Jozef Tiso gave an example as he was also counted as a Hungarian during this cenzus).17 In the case, that Hungarian does not accept result of Czechoslovak census they proposed to use Hungarian census from 1880 (before the peak of magyarization) as a compromise. They also did not agree on definition of "pure Hungarian" towns like Košice as were understood by Hungarian delegates.
|Year||Slovaques (Slovaks)||Magyars (Hungarians)||Allemands (Germans)||Ruthènes (Ruthenians)|
|1880||(40.9%) 10,311||(39.8%) 10,007||4,218|
The request for plebiscite for Slovaks and Ruthenians about rejoining to Hungary was refused as an irrelevant, because the Munich Agreement did not address question of these two nations. It violated sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and more, Ruthenian delegate declared that Ruthenian nation (except communists) already expressed their will to live in Czechoslovakia in the past.19
The Hungarian delegation formulated their demands in ultimate way and refused several Czechoslovak proposals. The Czechoslovak delegation offered Hungary the creation of an autonomous Hungarian territory within Slovakia.20 Kánya characterized the proposal as a "bad joke" and declared that it is "absolutely impossible to discuss about this question".20 Czechoslovakia then offered the cession of Great Rye Island (Slovak: Žitný ostrov, Hungarian: Csallóköz, 1838 km², with 105,418 inhabitants of whom an overwhelming majority were Hungarians), the creation of a free port in the town of Komárno, and a population exchange in the remaining frontier regions.
Since Hungary turned down this offer as well, on October 13 the Czechoslovak delegation proposed another solution. The goal of this Czechoslovak proposal was to the create borders with balanced minorities in both states (including i.e. Slovaks in Békés County).21 Beside principle of balanced minorities, the proposal included Czechoslovak strategic interest to preserve railway to Carpathian Ruthenia. Pál Teleki refused proposal without a deeper study22 as a "humorous border" and that Hungarian delegation "analyzed map only to be polite".23
Even if Czechoslovak delegation declared that it is open for further discussion about its proposal and offered consultation with their experts for justification, Hungarian delegation refused further discussion.24 On the evening of October 13, after consultations in Budapest, Kánya declared that the negotiations had failed and asked the four signatories of the Munich Agreement to be the adjudicator. As the United Kingdom and France had decided not to make any decision, the adjudicators became Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister and Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister.
On October 13, the day the negotiations deadlocked, Hungary conducted a partial mobilization. Czechoslovakia performed actions to strengthen its security and declared martial law in the frontier region.25 After the failure of bilateral negotiations, dispute about borders escalated into wider international level. Axis powers took the initiative in favor of Hungary to realize their own plans in the region.
Hungary sent delegations both to Italy and to Germany. Count Csáky went to Rome while Kálmán Darányi to Germany. Kálmán Darányi told to Adolf Hitler that Hungary is ready to fight and "will not accept behavior of Slovaks".26 However, the situation in central Europe changed after the Munich Agreement and German-Hungarian-Polish block was over. Germany refused to do steps to strengthen Hungary too much.27 Hitler declared if Hungary started a conflict, nobody would help her. He refused idea of common conference of four signers of the Munich Agreement, demands for plebiscite in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia and Hungarian claims for Bratislava.26 Instead, he advised Hungary to continue the negotiations and to preserve the ethnic principle. He proposed that Germany will act as a mediator. Ribbentrop and Darányi agreed on map which should be offered to Czechoslovakia ("Ribbentrop line"). This line later became source of misunderstanding between Hungary and Germany. According to Darányi, Ribbentrop did not accept his requests because several important towns remained on the Czechoslovak side28 (Bratislava, Nitra, Uzhorod and Mukachevo. The question of Košice was open27). Germany refused such accusations and declared that Ribbentrop line was created after consultation and with Darányi and with his agreement. When Hungarian government insisted on its opinion, Ribbentrop announced that German mediation ended.26
At the same time as Darányi, Czechoslovak foreign minister František Chvalkovský also visited Germany to negotiate with Nazi representatives. Adolf Hitler accused Czechoslovakia for the failure of negotiations with Hungary and requested for their restoration. He gave to Chvalkovský map with Ribbentrop line and promised to guarantee new borders based on this proposal. Back in Prague, Chvalkovský recommended accepting the Ribbentrop line. However, Slovak autonomous government was against such solution and hoped that it is possible to achieve further corrections. On October 19, Tiso and Ďurčanský met with Ribbentrop in Munich and managed to persuade him to assign Košice to Czechoslovakia and to accept the prior proposal that there should remain balanced minorities both in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.29 In evidence material prepared by Czechoslovak experts they argued by unreliability of Hungarian statistics and that Hungarian demands are not compliant with ethnic principle, but driven by foreign policy and strategic factors.30 They argued that Hungarian claim for Košice is not motivated by ethnic or historical reasons, but it is focused on elimination of the largest communication, economic and cultural center it the east and on interruption of railway to Carpatian Ruthenia and allied Romania (total isolation of eastern part of republic which should be later annexed by Hungary).29 Both Tiso and Ďurčanský believed that they persuaded Hitler. Tiso sent letter to Prague to notify about positive results.30
A few days later, Ribbentrop revealed to be quite hostile to the Hungarians. As Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano saw it, "The truth is that he intends to protect Czechoslovakia as far as he can and sacrifice the ambitions, even the legitimate ambitions, of Hungary".citation needed
After October 17, activities around Subcarpathian Rus intensified. Poland proposed a partition of Subcarpathian Rus among Hungary, Poland and Romania. Romania, staunch ally of Czechoslovakia against Hungary, rebuffed the proposal, even offering military support for Czechoslovakia in Subcarpathia. Hungary, in turn, attempted to persuade the Carpathorusyn representatives to become part of Hungary. Since a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, which would arise by a Hungarian annexation of Subcarpathian Rus, had been a long-time dream of both Poland and Hungary,citation needed Poland was moving troops toward that frontier for support. However, since a common Polish-Hungarian frontier would mean a minor flanking of Germany, Germany was willing to face such a common frontier only if Poland made compensation by giving up the Danzig corridor to East Prussia.citation needed Poland refused the German proposal. On October 20, the Rusyns produced a resolution more or less in favor of a plebiscite concerning the entirety of Carpathorus becoming part of Hungary.citation needed Five days later Subcarpathian Prime Minister Andriy Borody was placed under arrest in Prague, and Subcarpathian Foreign Minister Avhustyn Voloshyn was appointed prime minister in his stead. He was willing to consider the cession only of ethnically Hungarian territories to Hungary, and rejected the idea of a plebiscite.
Negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary resumed via diplomatic channels. Czechoslovakia adopted "Ribbentrop line" in hope that it would receive a guarantee of new borders from the side of Axis powers and proposed it officially on October 22. Czechoslovakia offered to cede Hungary territory with 494,646 Hungarians and 168,632 Slovaks.31 Czechoslovakia would retain Bratislava, Nitra and Košice.29 Hungary turned down the proposal which caused Germany to withdraw its position of a mediator. Hungary demanded that the territories offered by Czechoslovakia be immediately occupied by Hungary, that there be a plebiscite in the disputed territory, and that Subcarpathia "decide its own future". For Czechoslovakia, it was obviously unacceptable to cede territories which were not subject of discussion immediately and to resolve question of the remaining parts later. By acceptance of such proposal, Czechoslovak boundaries fortification will stay on Hungarian side and Hungarian army could potentially break in deeper into Czechoslovak territory.32 Hungary also warned that if Czechoslovakia refused this proposal, Hungary would demand arbitration (Italo-German in Western Slovakia, Italo-German-Polish in Eastern Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus). In this situation, Czechoslovakia had no choice but to accept Hungarian demands or to agree with arbitration. This decision was forced also by fact that France and Great Britain lost interest on Czechoslovakia and considered the region to be in the German sphere of influence.33 Both parties hoped that Germany would support their demands. The Slovak autonomous government also accepted the idea of arbitration with unrealistic expectations based on assurances of Ribbentrop.33
Even if Hungarian government raised demand for arbitration, it had not previous approval of Germany. Germany insisted on its negative opinion and argued of Hitler's disagreement, Ribbentrop's disappointment with previous negotiations with Darányi and danger of military conflict in the case if one part does not accept results.34 Hungary managed to persuade Italy that the powerful German influence exercised through Czechoslovakia could be eliminated by a strong Hungary.35 Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano accepted proposal and promised to advocate Hungarian interests. During Ribbentrop's visit of Rome (October 27–30, 1938) Ciano persuaded Ribbentrop about importance of arbitration for the future position of Axis powers in the region and Ribbentrop promised to persuade also Hitler.35 Italy took initiative and proposed to achieve common agreement already in Rome as a basis for arbitration. Ciano, already instructed by Hungarian experts was in better position than less informed Ribbentrop and achieved several important concessions.35 On October 31, Hungarian envoy in Rome confidentially informed Hungarian government that "Ribbentrop definitely agreed with return of Košice, Uzhorod and Mukachevo".35
On October 29, 1938, Czechoslovakia and Hungary officially asked Germany and Italy to arbitrate, and declared in advance that they would abide by the results.35
The award was rendered in Vienna by the foreign ministers of Germany (Joachim von Ribbentrop) and Italy (Galeazzo Ciano). The Hungarian delegation was led by Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya, accompanied by Minister of Education Pál Teleki. The Czechoslovak delegation was led by Foreign Minister František Chvalkovský and by Ivan Krno. Important members of the Czechoslovak delegation included representatives of Subcarpathian Rus — Prime Minister Avgustyn Voloshyn — and of Slovakia: Prime Minister Jozef Tiso and Minister of Justice Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Hermann Göring was also present.
The arbitration began in the Belvedere Palace, in Vienna, at noon on November 2, 1938. The Czechoslovak and Hungarian delegations were allowed to present their arguments. Chvalkovský was brief and left the task of presenting the Czechoslovak case to Minister Krno. Even if it was explicitly demanded by Czechoslovak representatives, both arbiters refused to let Slovak Prime Minister Tiso and Subcarpathian Prime Minister Voloshyn participate. Ribbentrop and Ciano reasoned that only the representatives of the central governments could participate (Namely Czechoslovakia in this case rather than the partially autonomous Slovakia or Carpatho-Ruthenia).36 They assumed that Chvalkovský would be more submissive and Tiso would complicate negotiation.36 The negotiation had only formal character and a new border was drawn after half of day. When the award was announced by Ribbentrop around 7 p.m., the Czechoslovak delegation was so shocked that Jozef Tiso actually had to be talked by Ribbentrop and Chvalkovský into signing the document.37
Czechoslovakia was obliged to surrender the territories in southern Slovakia and southern Carpathian Ruthenia south of the line (and inclusive of the towns of) Senec (Szenc) - Galanta (Galánta) - Vráble (Verebély)- Levice (Léva) - Lučenec (Losonc) - Rimavská Sobota (Rimaszombat) - Jelšava (Jolsva) - Rožnava (Rozsnyó) - Košice (Kassa) - Michaľany (Szentmihályfalva) - Veľké Kapušany (Nagykapos) - Uzhhorod (Ungvár) - Mukachevo (Munkács) - to the border with Romania. Slovakia lost 10,390 km² with 853,670 inhabitants (according to census from 1930). Population of the annexed territory consisted of 503,980 Hungarians, 272,145 Slovaks or Czechs, 26,151 Jews, 8,947 Germans, 1,825 Ruthenians, 14,617 other and 26,005 foreign citizens.38 Czechoslovakia lost also additional territory in Carpathian Ruthenia. Slovaks in the annexed territory joined existing Slovak minority in Hungary, while only about 60.000 Hungarians39 remained in the non-annexed part of Slovakia. New border did not respect principle of ethnic borders requested by Hungary as a "correction of injustices of Treaty of Trianon" nor Hungarian census from 1910. The most obvious violations of ethnic principle occurred in areas around Nové Zámky-Vráble-Hurbanovo, area around Jelšava and around Košice.39 Only 8 of 79 villages around Košice had majority of Hungarian population,39 beside 42,245 Slovaks in Košice. Czechoslovakia lost direct railway connection to Carpathian Ruthenia and to allied Romania.
Tiso took the result as his personal failure especially because he had not arranged evacuation of Košice.37 He announced the results of the award on radio late in the evening, accused the central government of fault for its long term policy but accepted the result.note 240
The ceded territories were occupied by Hungarian honvéds (Magyar Királyi Honvédség) between November 5 and 10, 1938. On November 11, Hungarian Regent Miklós Horthy solemnly entered the principal town, Košice (Kassa). By that time 15,000 Czechs and Slovaks (the Czechs settled there after 1919) had left the town; 15,000 more would do so before the month was out, leaving perhaps 12,000 Slovaks and virtually no Czechs.citation needed
The recovered Upper Hungary territories were incorporated into Hungary on November 12, 1938, by act of the Hungarian Parliament. Following the ancient counties of the Kingdom of Hungary, the occupied territory was divided into two new counties with seats in Nové Zámky and Levice, while some lands became part of other Hungarian counties.
As the frontier established by the award had been set on a large-scale map, Hungary was able to shift the actual frontier even farther north during a delimitation process.citation needed Czechoslovakia did not protest, because its government was terrified of another arbitration.citation needed
The First Vienna Award led to worsening anti-Hungarian sentiments in Slovakia. Shortly after the award had been announced, János Esterházy, a leader of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, proposed that Hungary return to Slovakia 1000 km²of the territory that Hungary had received: predominantly Slovak lands between Šurany (Nagysurány) and Palárikovo (Tótmegyer) in order to ensure long-term peaceful coexistence between the two nations. His proposal was not accepted by the Hungarian government.41 Obvious violation of the ethic balance between the two countries' minorities that had repeatedly been endorsed years before by Hungary, as well as the short period between the award and a Hungarian attack against Slovakia on March 1939 caused the anti-Hungarian moods and social mobilizations against Hungarians became a significant unifying element in Slovaks during World War II. Anti-Hungarian demonstrations were held on each anniversary of the award. During demonstrations, anti-Hungarian watchwords were shouted and Hungarian houses or cultural institutions were damaged. On the third anniversary, a mob furious because of the shooting of Slovaks by Hungarian police in Komjatice destroyed the Hungarian Cultural House.42
Hungary annulled point 4 of article 27 of the Treaty of Trianon where it committed to respect new borders defined in the peace treaty. Hungary also violated articles 48 and 49 of the treaty which guaranteed independence and rights of new Czechoslovak state.43 In addition to territorial gains based on the First Vienna Award, Hungary ignored results of the arbitration and tried to annex Carpathian Ruthenia few weeks later.22
From the Middle Ages well into the 18th century, Hungary and Poland had shared a historic common border, and the two peoples had always enjoyed good-neighborly relations.44 Following the Munich Agreement (September 30, 1938) the two countries, from common as well as their own special interests, had worked together to restore their historic common border.45 A step toward their goal was realized with the First Vienna Award (November 2, 1938).
Under pressure from Hitler, Slovakia declared total independence on March 14, 1939, and Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. Two days earlier, Hitler had given Hungary permission to occupy the rest of Carpatho-Ruthenia within 24 hours, but to abstain from attempting to annex the remainder of Slovakia, which Hitler wanted to turn into a strategically located German ally, especially for his planned invasion of Poland.citation needed On March 14–15, what remained of Carpatho-Ruthenia declared its independence as Carpatho-Ukraine, and shortly after, between March 15 and 18, was occupied by Hungary. After Carpatho-Ukraine, Hungary occupied a small part of Slovakia on March 15. Seeing no substantial reaction, Hungary on March 23 launched a larger attack on Eastern Slovakia. The plan was to "advance as far west as possible."citation needed After a short Slovak-Hungarian War (with several Hungarian air raids, e.g. March 24 on Spišská Nová Ves, Hungary was forced by Germany to stop and negotiate. As a result of the negotiations (March 27–April 4), Hungary received further territories in Eastern Slovakia (1,897 km²) with 69,630 inhabitants, almost exclusively Slovaks or Rusyns.citation needed Unlike the earlier Vienna Award, these annexed territories were not justified on ethnic grounds. (Hungarian justified this under the grounds that the Vienna award was an arbitration between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the latter had ceased to exist a few days earlier.citation needed)
Until mid-March 1939, Germany had considered that "for military reasons a common Hungarian-Polish frontier was undesirable". Indeed Hitler, when in March 1939 authorizing Hungary to occupy the rest of Carpathorus, had warned Hungary not to touch the remainder of Slovakia. He meant to use Slovakia as a staging ground for his planned invasion of Poland. In March 1939 Hitler changed his mind about the common Hungarian-Polish frontier, and decided to betray Germany's ally, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, who had already in 1938 begun organizing Ukrainian military units in a sich outside Uzhhorod under German tutelage – a sich that Polish political and military authorities saw as a real and present danger to nearby southeastern Poland, with its largely Ukrainian population.46 Hitler, however, was concerned that if a Ukrainian army organized in Rus were to accompany German forces invading the Soviet Union, Ukrainian nationalists would insist on the establishment of an independent Ukraine; Hitler, who had plans for the natural and farming resources of Ukraine, did not want to have to deal with an independent Ukrainian government.47
Hitler would soon have cause to regret his decision regarding the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine. In six months, during his 1939 invasion of Poland, the common Hungarian-Polish border would become of major importance when Admiral Horthy's government, on the ground of long-time friendship between Poles and Hungarians, declined, as a matter of Hungarian honor,48 Hitler's request to transit German forces across Carpathian Rus into southeastern Poland to speed Poland's conquest. This in turn allowed the Polish government and tens of thousands of Polish military personnel to escape into neighboring Hungary and Romania, and from there to France and French-mandated Syria to carry on operations as the third-strongest Allied belligerent after Britain and France. Also, for a time Polish and British intelligence agents and couriers, including the notable Krystyna Skarbek, used Hungary's Carpathorus as a route across the Carpathian Mountains to and from Poland.49
The Vienna Award escalated in Slovakia into the first deportations of Jews. Tiso and his collaborators looked for a scapegoat which was found in Jews, because of their demonstration for annexation of Bratislava to Hungary in the evening before arbitration. Between November 4–5, 1938, Slovakia's autonomous government deported 7,500 Jews into the annexed territory (Tiso justified this step as "letting them go where they wanted"). Hungary refused to accept these people, which included some who were elderly or children, and the deported Jews found themselves imprisoned in no man's land in the cold autumn weather. Hundreds of Jews stayed in a camp in Veľký Kýr a Miloslavov, where they were unable to move to actual residences in either Slovakia or Hungary.50
After the Vienna Award, the Hungarian government and United Hungarian Party together organized celebrations and a triumphant entry of the Hungarian army into the annexed territories. Organizers consciously imitated entry of Hitler's army into the Sudetenland.51 The result of arbitration was met by the most of the Hungarian population with local statements of disagreement.51 Hungarian Honvéds were not welcomed also in some "pure Hungarian" villages and in one village their accommodation had to be arranged by force.52 A few days before arbitration Budapest also received messages from some of borderline villages refusing annexation by Hungary ("Stay there, do not liberate us. We are having a good time, better then you, liberate yourself").52 The Vienna Award finally refuted inter-war Hungarian propaganda that "Slovak brothers" dreamed about return to the thousand-years-old Hungarian empire, and that they merely could not openly declare their opinion under Czech domination.
Hungary imposed military administration on the annexed territories.52 Between October 28–29, 1938, Béla Imrédy and the leader of the United Hungarian Party Andor Jaross made an agreement that representatives of the party who stayed in annexed territories would be part of a civic group of general staff, which should hold supreme authority.53 One of its parts (the Upper Country Unification Group) later became the basis for the Ministry for Upper Country led by Jaross. All other political parties were banned and obstacles were made for the introduction of other parties from Hungary. The United Hungarian Party then used its power for the persecution of Slovaks, but also of Hungarians who had before the award disagreed with its activities against Czechoslovakia.53 Military administration was changed to civic on December 21, 1938.54
Miklós Horthy promised to guarantee freedom of Slovak language and culture on the annexed territory, but Hungary failed to protect its new minorities. The recommendations of the Slovak government for non-Hungarian citizens were also naive, counterproductive and led to unnecessary losses of lives and property.56 The Slovak government recommended to stay in the Southern Slovakia and promised "adequate help and protection".57 However, Czechoslovak police was only able to record complaints and looses of refugees in the following period . Hungary breached several points of the agreement about evacuation and transfer of territory from the beginning, particularly commitment to prevent violent acts on territory under its administration.58 Already on November 5, 1938, the Hungarian General Staff gave order to expel all Slovak and Czech colonists59 and their family members and descendants.60 Exceptions were not allowed even for persons who declared Hungarian nationality.60 The colonists were followed by state employees, Slovak farmers including those who inherited land or bought with their own money6162 and later by anybody denoted as an unreliable. Lists of unreliable persons were prepared by members of Hungarian United Party already before the First Vienna Award.62 Measures were realized in a violent way with shooting, casualties and looting of Slovak and Czech stores and property.61 In Gbelce (Köbölkút), three Czech colonists were shot dead and one hanged.63 Employees of public administration had to leave territory in 48 hours and they were replaced by administration from Hungary.62 All non-Hungarian organizations were dissolved and their property was confiscated or given to Hungarian organisations.64 In Nové Zámky Jewish citizens were interned in colony abandoned by Slovaks and Czechs shortly after annexation, Jewish lease agreements were canceled and office spaces given to Christians.64 Army and police with cooperation with local Hungarians started home inspections without any previous permission and confiscated food stocks, livestock, grain, etc.62
All schools build by Slovak League (approximately 150) were declared to be a property of Hungarian state.65 862 of 1,119 teachers lost their jobs until the end of 1938, other followed in the next years.65 Expelling of teachers was often related to violence and public degradation.65 Slovaks lost 386 primary schools attended by 45,709 Slovak children and 29 council schools ("burgher schools") attended by 10,750 children.66 Four grammar school were closed only in Košice, additional six in other towns.66 Remaining Slovak state employees (like railway workers) were forced to enroll their children into Hungarian schools.67 In several Slovak villages police dispersed parents' associations and parents who demanded Slovak schools were beaten.68 Parents from Ruskov and Blažice who demanded Slovak school were imprisoned for two weeks. In several places Hungarian police burned Slovak school supplies, requested burning by director or simply confiscated them.note 368 However, this pressure was not sufficient in general, i.e. in Šurany Slovaks excluded from their community anybody who enrolled children to Hungarian school.69 Overcrowding of Hungarian classes with Slovaks had negative impact also on quality of education of local Hungarian population.69
Slow adoption of Hungarian language confirmed that the idea of Hungarian state remained fictitious for Slovaks.70 On the fall of 1943, Hungarian government came to conclusion that direct magyarization trends shall be replaced by educational activities in mother tongue of minorities. This plan was not realized because of later occupation of Hungary by Germany.71
The Hungarian government ordered revision of trade licences for Jews on annexed territory. This anti-Jewish measure was not applied for the rest of Hungary in that time. 80% of Jews lost their license with significant impact on economic life - in towns like Košice, Nové Zámky or Lučenec every second shop was closed.72
Slovakia lost 41% of its agricultural soil which produced approximately 80% of products required for food supply.73 This was a notable loss for Slovakia, but was not of clear benefit for Hungary. Due to existing problems with overproduction, annexation caused problems both for local farmers and for the economic policy of Hungary. Only half of Southern Slovakia's 400 000 tons of wheat production was used locally, and the second half had no consumers.74 The border between the annexed territory and Hungary proper was strictly closed during military administration, so distribution in this direction was impossible.note 4 The situation improved only partially during civic administration, when grain and livestock prices remained low. The Hungarian government tried to improve the situation by state intervention purchases, but this failed to resolve the long-term implications of the overproduction. Prices of agricultural goods decreased by 20-30%.75 Existing cartels in Hungary had limited possibilities to grow the most profitable crops. This included in particular sugar-beet and tobacco, areas which became constrained and for which the conditions of farmers growing such crops became worse. This resulted in The Economic Association of Nitra County demanding the right "to grow sugar-beet under the same conditions as during Czech rule" (request was refused).76 On February 24, 1939, the government cabinet restricted growing of red pepper only to limited areas around Nové Zámky.
Czechoslovakia provided more job opportunities by construction of roads, regulation of rivers and building construction. These projects were stopped after annexation. Unemployment rates increased, and unlike Czechoslovakia Hungary did not provide any unemployment benefits or state health insurance for workers in agriculture. Retirement and disability pensions were also lower.77 Unemployed workers who received support under Czechoslovakian rule requested the same from Hungary.78 Salaries and as working conditions worsened, but taxes increased in the same time. Money conversion in exchange rate disadvantageous for local citizens (7:1) automatically decreased salaries by 20%.79 On the other hand, Hungarian soldiers profited from the exchange rate and bought up the remaining cheap Czechoslovak goods at the expense of their sellers. New goods from Hungary were 20-30% more expensive. Electricity, radio and railway tickets became also more expensive.
Local Hungarians had difficulties understanding these problems, because interwar propaganda had portrayed reunification of the ethnically Hungarian territories as mutually beneficial for both parties. However, in many aspects, Czechoslovakia gave Hungarians more civic and social rights than Hungary did just a year later. The Hungarian government answered by appealing to Hungarian patriotism. note 5 In April 1939, Hungarian professors wrote demands to the Hungarian government and protested against price rates and their bad social situation.79
Social problems on annexed territory were discussed in the cabinet meeting on December 22, 1939. Interior minister Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, who was responsible also for questions of common good, health service and social policy, proposed a solution based on unification. The Minister for Upper Country Andor Jaross disagreed with this solution and proposed to provide the Czechoslovak welfare system for those in the annexed areas for a transitional period, but had no objections to decrease it to Hungarian level.73 The cabinet finally agreed on a compromise. Elimination of Czechoslovak laws from annexed territory was understood as a duty, but it had to be done step by step. The first step was to decrease the value of a retirement pension from its Czechoslovak value (150 pengő) to its Hungarian value (60 pengő) through a transition value of 120 pengő. Sickness insurance for workers in agriculture was preserved in the form of Czechoslovak regulation for the moment, but it was changed from compulsory to voluntary. In Slovakia, the Czechoslovak system of welfare was preserved also after the break-up of Czechoslovakia.73
In terms of international law, the Vienna Award was later ruled to be null and void. Even if it was presented as a voluntary act of two sovereign states in arbitration, the Czechoslovak government had accepted arbitration under a presumed threat from both arbiters (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) and under heavy influence of the ultimate demands of Hungary. Under international law, the act is considered to have been illegal and its result could not be accepted as a valid. Just as the Munich agreement was later nullified as Czechoslovakia's interests were largely ignored and the arbiters had used their military prowess to pressure those in the agreement, The Vienna Award was at the end of World War II also found to be illegal. From this legal standpoint, the Vienna Award never existed was a valid legal act.80
On December 11, 1940, the British ministry of foreign affairs confirmed to the Czechoslovak government that Great Britain was not bound to Munich Agreement in question of Czechoslovak borders. In their interpretation, the Munich Agreement was signed properly, but became invalid on March 15, 1939. Negotiations about the British standpoint continued until halfway through 1942. On June 9, 1942, Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov confirmed restoration of Czechoslovakia to its borders before the Munich Agreement. On September 26, 1944, Italian foreign minister Carlo Sforza informed Czechoslovak representative that Italy had considered the Munich Agreement and the First Vienna Award to be invalid from their beginnings.81 This was confirmed in the peace treaty with Hungary (Treaty of Paris) signed February 10, 1947, whose Article 1 (4a) stated that "The decisions of the Vienna Award of November 2, 1938, are declared null and void". The Treaty went on to declare that the frontier between Hungary and Czechoslovakia was to be fixed along the former frontier between Hungary and Czechoslovakia as it existed on January 1, 1938 (except three villages south of Bratislava, which were given as a bridgehead to Czechoslovakia).
The Munich Agreement, the First Vienna Award and participation of minority parties on break-up of Czechoslovakia resulted into redefinition of Czechoslovak minority policy after war. While interwar Czechoslovakia guaranteed relatively high minority rights and civic and social rights of Hungarians were higher than in Hungary, they became target of serious discrimination in period after war. Hungarian question had to be resolved by population exchange between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, slovakization and deportations of Hungarians within Czechoslovakia (particularly to the Sudetenland).82 The Government Program of Košice (April 5, 1945) accepted principle of collective guilt for German and Hungarian minorities. The article X. and XI. ordered seizure of their property and the article XV. closure of minority schools. Measures against minorities were reasoned by "terrible experience of Czechs and Slovaks with German and Hungarian minorities, which largely become willing tool in the services of aggressive policy from outside; and where especially Czechoslovak Germans cooperated directly on extermination campaign against the Czech and Slovak nation". The government program was followed by series of regulations in the same spirit. Except anti-fascistic fighters, Hungarians lost Czechoslovak citizenship because of the presidential decree on August 2, 1945. The presidential decree "About amnesty for acts performed during anti-fascistic fight" prevented punishment of the most cruel crimes against Hungarian minority.83 Both countries did mutual population exchange (68.407 Hungarians and 59.774 Slovaks).84 A further 31,780 Hungarians were expelled because they had settled in these territories only after the Vienna Award.82
The communistic coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 did not immediately improve status of Hungarians, but relationships began to normalize in the second half of 1948.85 During his visit in Budapest on March 15, 1948, chairman of the Czechoslovak Constitutional National Assembly declared that Hungarian people is not responsible for oppression of Slovak people in the past, crimes of Hungarian noblemen nor regime of Miklós Horthy.86 In October 1948 the Czechoslovak parliament restored Czechoslovak citizenship to Hungarians86 who were residents in Slovakia on November 1, 1938, and who had not been convicted of crime. The return of property disappeared on the background of communistic collectivization and became irrelevant.85 On April 16, 1949, both countries signed agreement about friendship and cooperation. On July 25, 1949, Hungarian government committed to return artistic and historical relic's seized after the First Vienna Award. The final agreement was signed on November 11, 1951 with validity for ten years, but has not been fully realized until nowadays.86
- M. Horthy declared to Polish Envoy Leon Orłowski in Budapest on October 16, 1938: "A Hungarian military intervention would be a disaster for Hungary at this moment, because the Czechoslovak army has currently the best arms in Europe and Budapest is only five minutes from the border for Czechoslovak aircraft. They would neutralize me before I could get up from my bed." Deák 1991, p. 149
- "Superpowers decided: we cannot do anything but lower our heads and work. However, nobody cannot stop us to say to the whole world that injustice has been committed against the Slovak nation. According to the Trianon dictate only 6% of Hungarians had to live in Slovakia, but according to new borders of Slovakia nearly 20% of Slovaks will live in Hungary." Fabricius 2002, p. 25.
- Trstená pri Hornáde, Nižná Myšeľ, Čaňa, Ždaňa.
- Any package over 5 kg required special permission
- "National feeling is not increased or decreased by price of shoelaces or the cost of grain, ... national feeling... is above material factors and driven by higher principles."
- Deák 2008, p. 9.
- Deák 1992, p. 30.
- Deák 1992, p. 46.
- Deák 1992, p. 52.
- Deák 2008, p. 10.
- Deák 2008, p. 11.
- Deák 1991, p. 150.
- Čaplovič 2008, p. 51.
- Chorvát 2008, p. 58.
- Čaplovič 2008, p. 62.
- Deák 1998, p. 20.
- Bystrický 2008, p. 37.
- Bystrický 2008, p. 38.
- Bystrický 2008, p. 39.
- Deák 1998, p. 22.
- Deák 2002, p. 78.
- Deák 1998, p. 24.
- Deák 2002, pp. 150-151.
- Deák 2002, p. 111.
- Deák 2002, p. 112.
- Deák 2002, pp. 117-118.
- Deák 1998, p. 25.
- Deák 2002, p. 122.
- Deák 2002, p. 123.
- Deák 1991, p. 163.
- Deák & 1991 164.
- Deák 1998, p. 28.
- Deák 200, p. 164.
- Deák 1998, p. 29.
- Deák 1991, p. 165.
- Deák 1998, p. 30.
- Deák 2002, p. 172.
- Deák 1998, p. 31.
- Deák 2002, p. 170.
- Deák 1991, p. 167.
- Deák 1998, p. 33.
- Deák 1998, p. 34.
- Deák 2002, p. 24.
- Deák 2008, p. 21.
- Fabricius 2002, p. 25.
- Janek 2012, p. 46.
- Lacko 2008, p. 104.
- Deák 1998, p. 58.
- See "Pole and Hungarian cousins be"
- Józef Kasparek, "Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia", East European Quarterly", vol. XXIII, no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 366-67, 370. Józef Kasparek, Przepust karpacki: tajna akcja polskiego wywiadu (The Carpathian Bridge: a Covert Polish Intelligence Operation), p. 11.
- Józef Kasparek, "Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia", p. 366.
- Józef Kasparek, "Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia", pp. 370-71.
- Józef Kasparek, "Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia", p. 370.
- Józef Kasparek, "Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia," pp. 371–73;Józef Kasparek, Przepust karpacki (The Carpathian Bridge); and Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Referat o działaniach dywersyjnych na Rusi Karpackiej" ("Report on Covert Operations in Carpathian Rus").
- Nižňanský 2000.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 38.
- Deák 1998, p. 40.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 40.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 50.
- Mitáč 2011, p. 137.
- Vrábel 20011, p. 34.
- Vrábel 20011, p. 35.
- Vrábel 2011, p. 38.
- Deák 1991, p. 177.
- Vrábel 2011, p. 40.
- Deák 1991, p. 178.
- Jablonický 2011, p. 57.
- Jablonický 2011, p. 67.
- Vrábel 2011, p. 39.
- Jablonický 2011, p. 61.
- Jablonický 2011, p. 62.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 119.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 122.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 121.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 135.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 136.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 58.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 65.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 49.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 51.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 52.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 61.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 57.
- Tilkovszky 1972, p. 59.
- Deák 1998, pp. 57-58.
- Klimko 2008, p. 105.
- Šutaj 2005, p. 12.
- Pástor 2011, p. 106.
- Pástor 2011, p. 111.
- Šutaj 2008, p. 96.
- Pástor 2011, p. 113.
- Bystrický, Valerián (2008). "Vnútropolitický ohlas na zmeny hraníc v roku 1938". In Šmihula, Daniel. Viedenská arbitráž v roku 1938 a jej európske súvislosti Vienna Award in 1938 and its European context (in Slovak). Bratislava: Ševt. ISBN 978-80-8106-009-0.
- Chorvát, Peter (2008). "Maďarské kráľovské hovédskto vs. československé opevnenia - k problémom interacie" [Royal Hungarian Army vs. Czechoslovak fortifications - about interaction problems]. Vojenská história (in Slovak) (Vojenský historický ústav) 1.
- Deák, Ladislav (1991). Hra o Slovensko The Game for Slovakia (in Slovak). Bratislava: Slovak Academy of Sciences. ISBN 80-224-0370-9.
- Deák, Ladislav (1998). Viedenská arbitráž - "Mníchov pre Slovensko" Vienna Award - "Munich for Slovakia" (in Slovak). Bratislava: Korene. ISBN 80-967587-7-2.
- Deák, Ladislav (2002). Viedenská arbitráž 2. November 1938. Dokumenty, zv. 1 (20. September – 2. November 1938) Vienna Award of November 2, 1938: Documents, volume 1 (September 20 - November 2, 1938) (in Slovak, Czech, Hungarian, French, German). Martin: Matica Slovenská.
- Fabricius, Miroslav (2007). Jozef Tiso - Prejavy a články (1938-1944) Jozef Tiso - Speeches and articles (1938-1944) (in Slovak). Bratislava: AEPress. ISBN 80-88880-46-7.
- Janek, István (March 2012). "János Esterházy v histórii stredovýchodnej Európy" [János Esterházy in the history of central-eastern Europe]. Historická revue (in Slovak) 3.
- Jablonický, Viliam (2011). "Represie na nemaďarskom obyvateľstve na okupovanom južnom Slovensku po roku 1938 a ich odraz v spoločenskom a kultúrnom povedomí" [Repressions against non-Hungarian population in occupied southern Slovakia after 1938 and their reflection in social and cultural awareness]. In Mitáč, Ján. Juh Slovenska po Viedeňskej arbitráži 1938 - 1945 Southern Slovakia after the First Vienna Award 1938 - 1945 (in Slovak). Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa. ISBN 978-80-89335-45-9.
- Klimko, Jozef (2008). "Viedenská arbitráž a súčasnosť" [Vienna Award and presence]. In Šmihula, Daniel. Viedenská arbitráž v roku 1938 a jej európske súvislosti Vienna Award in 1938 and its European context (in Slovak). Bratislava: Ševt. ISBN 978-80-8106-009-0.
- Lacko, Martin (2008). Slovenská republika 1939-1945 (in Slovak). Bratislava: Perfekt. ISBN 978-80-8046-408-0.
- Mitáč, Ján (2011). "Krvavý incident v Šuranoch na Vianoce 1938 v spomienkach obyvateľov mesta Šurany" [Bloody incident in Šurany on Christmas 1938 in the memories of citizens of Šurany]. In Mitáč, Ján. Juh Slovenska po Viedeňskej arbitráži 1938 - 1945 Southern Slovakia after the First Vienna Award 1938 - 1945 (in Slovak). Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa. ISBN 978-80-89335-45-9.
- Nižňanský, Eduard (2000). Prvé deportácie židov z územia Slovenska v novembri 1938 a úloha Jozefa Falátha a Adolfa Eichmanna The first deportation of Jews from territorry of Slovakia in November 1938 and role of Jozef Faláth and Adolf Eichmann (in Slovak). Bratislava: Zing Print. ISBN 80-88997-03-8.
- Pástor, Zoltán (2011). Slováci a Maďari Slovaks and Hungarians (in Slovak). Martin: Matica Slovenská. ISBN 978-80-8128-004-7.
- Šutaj, Štefan (2005). Nútené presídlenie Maďarov do Čiech Forced transfer of Hungarians to the Czech Lands (in Slovak). Prešov: Univerzum. ISBN 80-89046-29-0.
- Tilkovszky, Loránt (1972). Južné Slovensko v rokoch 1938-1945 Southern Slovakia during the years 1938-1945 (in Slovak). Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied.
- Vrábel, Ferdinad (2011). "Náprava "krív" z Trianonu? Niekoľko epizód z obsadzovania južného Slovenska maďarským vojskom z v novembri 1938" [Correction od "injustices" of Trianon? Several episodes from occupation by southern SLovakia by Hungarian army in November 1938]. In Mitáč, Ján. Juh Slovenska po Viedeňskej arbitráži 1938 - 1945 Southern Slovakia after the First Vienna Award 1938 - 1945 (in Slovak). Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa. ISBN 978-80-89335-45-9.
- Deák, Ladislav, Hungary's game for Slovakia, Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1996. (translation of Hra o Slovensko)
- Encyklopédia Slovenska (Encyclopedia of Slovakia), vol. VI, Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1982.
- Jerzy Kupliński, "Polskie działania dywersyjne na Ukrainie Zakarpackiej w 1938 r." ("Polish 1938 Covert Operations in Transcarpathian Ukraine"), Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny (Military Historical Review), no. 4, 1996.
- Kronika Slovenska (Chronicle of Slovakia), vol. II, Fortuna Print Praha, 1999.
- Józef Kasparek, "Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia", East European Quarterly", vol. XXIII, no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 365–73.
- Józef Kasparek, Przepust karpacki: tajna akcja polskiego wywiadu (The Carpathian Bridge: a Covert Polish Intelligence Operation), Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Czasopism i Książek Technicznych SIGMA NOT, 1992, ISBN 83-85001-96-4.
- Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Referat o działaniach dywersyjnych na Rusi Karpackiej" ("Report on Covert Operations in Carpathian Rus"), in Zbiór dokumentów ppłk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza (Collection of Documents by Lt. Col. Edmund Charaszkiewicz), opracowanie, wstęp i przypisy (edited, with introduction and notes by) Andrzej Grzywacz, Marcin Kwiecień, Grzegorz Mazur, Kraków, Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000, ISBN 83-7188-449-4, pp. 106–30.
- Paweł Samuś, Kazimierz Badziak, Giennadij Matwiejew, Akcja "Łom": polskie działania dywersyjne na Rusi Zakarpackiej w świetle dokumentów Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego WP (Operation Crowbar: Polish Covert Operations in Transcarpathian Rus in Light of Documents of Section II of the Polish General Staff), Warsaw, Adiutor, 1998.
- Tadeusz A. Olszański, "Akcja Łom" ("Operation Crowbar"), Płaj: Almanach Karpacki, no. 21 (jesień [autumn] 2000).
- Dariusz Dąbrowski, "Rzeczpospolita Polska wobec kwestii Rusi Zakarpackiej (Podkarpackiej) 1938-1939" ("The Polish Republic and the Transcarpathian (Subcarpathian) Rus Question in 1938–39"), Europejskie Centrum Edukacyjne (European Educational Center), Toruń, 2007, ISBN 978-83-60738-04-7.
- Text of the first arbitral award of Vienna, from a UN website
- Text of the first arbitral award of Vienna
- Edward Chaszar: The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938
- Additional Annexation of Eastern Slovakia by Hungary, 23-26 March 1939