Japan–United States relations
Japan–United States relations (日米関係 Nichibeikankei?), are the relations between the United States and Japan. Today the United States and Japan have firm and very active political, economic and military relationships. The United States considers Japan to be one of its closest allies and partners12 and the Japanese in turn have expressed appreciation for the consistent support of the United States.3
- 1 Country comparison
- 2 Historical background
- 3 Pre–World War II period
- 4 1929-1941
- 5 Post–World War II period
- 6 1990s: After the cold war
- 7 Economic Relations
- 8 Military relations
- 9 See also
- 10 References
- 11 Further reading
- 12 External links
|Area||377,873 km2 (145,883 sq mi)||9,826,630 km2 (3,794,066 sq mi)|
|Population Density||337.6/km2 (874.4/sq mi)||31/km2 (80/sq mi)|
|Largest City||Tōkyō – 12,790,000 (32,450,000 Metro)||New York City – 8,363,710 (19,006,798 Metro)|
|Government||Unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy||Federal presidential constitutional republic|
|First Leader||Mutsuhito||George Washington|
|Current Leader||Akihito||Barack Obama|
|Official languages||None (Japanese de facto)||None at federal level (English de facto)|
|GDP (nominal)||US$5.855 trillion ($45,774 per capita)||US$15.065 trillion ($48,147 per capita)|
|Military expenditures||$48.86 billion (FY 2008)6||$663.7 billion (FY 2010)7|
- In 1791, two American ships commanded by the American explorer John Kendrick stopped for 11 days on Kii Oshima island, south of the Kii Peninsula. He is the first American known to have visited Japan. He apparently planted an American flag and claimed the islands, but there is no Japanese account of his visit.8
- In 1846, Commander James Biddle, sent by the United States Government to open trade, anchored himself in Tokyo Bay with two ships, one of which was armed with seventy-two cannons. Regardless, his demands for a trade agreement remained unsuccessful.9
- In 1848, Captain James Glynn sailed to Nagasaki, which led to the first successful negotiation by an American with sakoku Japan. Upon his return to North America, Glynn recommended to the Congress that any negotiations to open up Japan should be backed up by a demonstration of force; this paved the way for the later expedition of Commodore and lieutenant Matthew Perry.10
In 1852, American Commodore Matthew C. Perry embarked from Norfolk, Virginia, for Japan, in command of a squadron that would negotiate a Japanese trade treaty. Aboard a black-hulled steam frigate, he ported Mississippi, Plymouth, Saratoga, and Susquehanna at Uraga Harbor near Edo (present-day Tokyo) on July 8, 1853, and he was met by representatives of the Tokugawa Shogunate. They told him to proceed to Nagasaki, where the sakoku laws allowed limited trade by the Dutch. Perry refused to leave, and he demanded permission to present a letter from President Millard Fillmore, threatening force if he was denied. Japan had shunned modern technology for centuries, and the Japanese military wouldn't be able to resist Perry's ships; these "Black Ships" would later become a symbol of threatening Western technology in Japan.11 Perry returned in March 1854 with twice as many ships, finding that the delegates had prepared a treaty embodying virtually all the demands in Fillmore's letter; Perry signed the Convention of Kanagawa on March 31, 1854, and departed.12
Seven years later, the Shogun sent Kanrin Maru on a mission to the United States; it was his intention to show the world that Japan had mastered Western navigation techniques and ship technologies. On January 19, 1860, Kanrin Maru left the Uraga Channel for San Francisco. The delegation included Katsu Kaishu, as ship captain; Nakahama Manjirō; and Fukuzawa Yukichi. The Embassy went on to Washington via Panama, on American vessels.
The official objective of the mission was to send the first Japanese embassy to the United States ever, and also to ratify the new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the two governments. The delegates also tried to revise some of the unequal clauses in Perry's treaties; they were unsuccessful.
The second ambassador was Robert H. Pruyn, a New York politician who was a political ally and close friend to Secretary of State William Henry Seward who served from 1862 to 1865;.14 His major achievement was the successful negotiation following the Shimonoseki bombardment.15
In the late 19th century the opening of sugar plantations in the Kingdom of Hawaii led to the immigration of large numbers of Japanese. Hawaii became part of the U.S. in 1898, and the Japanese were the largest element of the population then, and have been the largest element ever since.
There was some friction over control of Hawaii and the Philippines, but Japan stood aside as the U.S. annexed those lands in 1898. Likewise the U.S. did not object when Japan took control of Korea. The two nations cooperated with the European powers in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, but the U.S. was increasingly troubled about Japan's denial of the Open Door Policy that would ensure that all nations could do business with China on an equal basis. President Theodore Roosevelt played a major role in negotiating an end to the war between Russia and Japan in 1905-6.
Vituperative anti-Japanese sentiment (especially on the West Coast) soured relations in the 1907-24 era.16 Washington did not want to anger Japan by passing legislation to bar Japanese immigration to the U.S. as had been done for Chinese immigration. Instead there was an informal "Gentlemen's Agreement" (1907-8) between the U.S. and Japan whereby Japan made sure there was very little or no movement to the U.S. The agreements were made by Secretary of State Elihu Root and Japan's Foreign Minister Tadasu Hayashi. The Agreement banned emigration of Japanese laborers to the U.S. or Hawaii and rescinded the segregation order of the San Francisco School Board in California, which had humiliated and angered the Japanese. The agreements remained effect until 1924 when Congress forbade all immigration from Japan.1718
Charles Neu concludes that Roosevelt's policies were a success:
- By the close of his presidency it was a largely successful policy based upon political realities at home and in the Far East and upon a firm belief that friendship with Japan was essential to preserve American interests in the Pacific.... Roosevelt's diplomacy during the Japanese-American crisis of 1906-1909 was shrewd, skillful, and responsible.19
In 1912, the people of Japan sent 3,020 cherry trees to the United States as a gift of friendship. First Lady of the United States, Mrs. Helen Herron Taft, and the Viscountess Chinda, wife of the Japanese Ambassador, planted the first two cherry trees on the northern bank of the Tidal Basin. These two original trees are still standing today at the south end of 17th Street. Workmen planted the remainder of the trees around the Tidal Basin and East Potomac Park.20
Both the U.S. and Japan fought on the Allied side. Japan's military took control of German bases in China and the Pacific, and in 1919 with U.S. approval was given a League of Nations mandate over the German islands north of the equator, with Australia getting the rest. The U.S. did not want any mandates.21
However there was a sharp conflict between Japan on the one hand and China, Britain and the U.S. over Japan's Twenty-One Demands made on China in 1915. These demands forced China to acknowledge Japanese possession of the former German holdings and its economic dominance of Manchuria, and had the potential of turning China into a puppet state. Washington expressed strongly negative reactions to Japan's rejection of the Open Door Policy. In the Bryan Note issued by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan on March 13, 1915, the U.S., while affirming Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria, Mongolia and Shandong, expressed concern over further encroachments to Chinese sovereignty.22
President Wilson fought vigorously against Japan's demands at Paris in 1919, but he lost because Britain and France supported Japan.23 In China there was outrage and Anti-Japanese sentiment escalated. The May Fourth Movement emerged as a student demand for China's honor.24 In 1922 the U.S. brokered a solution of the Shandong Problem. China was awarded nominal sovereignty over all of Shandong, including the former German holdings, while in practice Japan's economic dominance continued.25
Japan and the U.S. agreed on terms of naval limitations at the Washington Conference of 1921, with a ratio of naval force to be 5-5-4 for the U.S., Britain and Japan. Tensions arose with the 1924 American immigration law that prohibited further immigration from Japan.26
Relations between Japan and the United States became increasingly tense after the Manchurian/Mukden Incident and subsequent Japanese military seizure of much of China in 1937-39. American outrage focused on the Japanese attack on an American warship in Chinese waters in late 1937 (Japan apologized), and the atrocities of the Nanking Massacre at the same time. The United States had a powerful navy in the Pacific, and it was working closely with the British and the Dutch governments. When Japan seized Indochina (now Vietnam) in 1940-41, the United States, along with Australia, Britain and the Dutch government in exile, boycotted Japan via a trade embargo. They cut off 90% of Japan's oil supply, and Japan had to either withdraw from China or go to war with the US and Britain as well as China to get the oil.
Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Japanese American relations had been constricted for years. Reasons for this include the belief that Western powers were hostile to Japan. America already knew this and it led to problems arising within their relationship. The Japanese believed they were looked at as inferior. The relationship was also strained because the US opposed Japanese expansion and Japan’s demands were not being achieved by diplomacy. "... the Americans believe they are better than us. We are unable to keep a steady relationship with them as long as they hold these opinions. ... The Americans are not complying with our demands... For these reasons our relationship is constricted, shall remain that way and will not be able to grow." translated Masakazu Nanba 5 March 1938. These situations within their relationship all contributed to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The attack on Pearl Harbor was seen from a public eye as a surprise, however in analyzing Japanese-American relations over the years leading to the attack, one can see an erosion in communications between the two countries. Japan being an energy scarce country, expansion was seen as the only viable source of securing their energy needs. The attack can only be seen as a culmination point in regards to Japanese-American interests in the Pacific region. Under the Washington Naval treaty and the London Naval treaty, the American navy was to be equal to the Japanese army by a ratio of 10:7.27 However, as of 1934, the Japanese ended their disarmament policies and enabled rearmament policy with no limitations.27 The government in Tokyo was well informed of its military weakness in the Pacific in regards to the American fleet. The foremost important factor in realigning their military policies was the need by Japan to move away from U.S oil dependence, securing new oil and energy sources.28
Through the 1930s, Japan's oil consumption was dependent at 90% on imports, 80% of it coming from the United States.28 Furthermore, the vast majority of this oil import was oriented towards the Navy and the military.29 America opposed Tokyo's expansionist policies in China, the East Indies and the Pacific Islands. On July 26, 1940 the U.S. government passed the Export Control Act, cutting oil, iron and steel exports to Japan.28 This containment policy was seen by Washington as a warning to Japan that any further military expansion would result in further sanctions. However, Tokyo saw it as a blockade to counter Japanese military and economic strength. Accordingly, by the time the United States enforced the Export Act, Japan had stockpiled around 54 million barrels of oil.30 America exported oil to Japan until 1940, long after the invasion of Manchuria. Sanctions were too weak and not focused enough to stop the Japanese military at an early stage of expansion. By 1940, the American share of export of oil on the Japanese market dropped to 60%.31
These various actions taken by Washington were nothing compared to the full embargo imposed on Japan in July 1941.30 All oil shipments were held back and Japanese assets in the United States were to be frozen. Since only 4.5 million barrels of oil were coming in from the Dutch East Indies, Japan's reaction was to organize an attack of the United States on the Pacific front.28 The attacks on Pearl Harbor were strongly influenced by the energy insecurity which the embargo created.
Japan attacked the American navy base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. In response, the United States declared war on Japan, starting a four-year war between the United States and Japan. Japan's Axis allies, including Nazi Germany, declared war on the United States shortly after the attack, bringing the United States into World War II. By producing materials, island-hopping, and heavy bombing of Japanese cities and conquering Japanese-held areas (and after two uses of nuclear weapons and Russia's official entry into war against Japan), the United States and its allies forced Japan to surrender, thus ending the hostilities.
At the end of the Second World War, Japan was occupied by the Allied Powers, led by the United States with contributions from Australia, India, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. This was the first time since the unification of Japan that the island nation had been occupied by a foreign power. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on September 8, 1951, marked the end of the Allied occupation, and when it went into effect on April 28, 1952, Japan was once again an independent state, and an ally of the United States.
In the years after World War II, Japan's relations with the United States were placed on an equal footing for the first time at the end of the occupation by the Allied forces in April 1952. This equality, the legal basis of which was laid down in the peace treaty signed by forty-eight Allied nations and Japan, was initially largely nominal, because in the early postoccupation period Japan required direct United States economic assistance. A favorable Japanese balance of payments with the United States was achieved in 1954, mainly as a result of United States military and aid spending in Japan.32
The Japanese people's feeling of dependence lessened gradually as the disastrous results of World War II subsided into the background and trade with the United States expanded. Self-confidence grew as the country applied its resources and organizational skill to regaining economic health. This situation gave rise to a general desire for greater independence from United States influence. During the 1950s and 1960s, this feeling was especially evident in the Japanese attitude toward United States military bases on the four main islands of Japan and in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying the southern two-thirds of the Ryukyu Islands.
The government had to balance left-wing pressure advocating dissociation from the United States allegedly 'against the realities' of the need for military protection. Recognizing the popular desire for the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the Bonin Islands (also known as the Ogasawara Islands), the United States as early as 1953 relinquished its control of the Amami group of islands at the northern end of the Ryukyu Islands. But the United States made no commitment to return Okinawa, which was then under United States military administration for an indefinite period as provided in Article 3 of the peace treaty. Popular agitation culminated in a unanimous resolution adopted by the Diet in June 1956, calling for a return of Okinawa to Japan.
Bilateral talks on revising the 1952 security pact began in 1959, and the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in Washington on January 19, 1960. When the pact was submitted to the Diet for ratification on February 5, it became the subject of bitter debate over the Japan–United States relationship and the occasion for violence in an all-out effort by the leftist opposition to prevent its passage. It was finally approved by the House of Representatives on May 20. Japan Socialist Party deputies boycotted the lower house session and tried to prevent the LDP deputies from entering the chamber; they were forcibly removed by the police. Massive demonstrations and rioting by students and trade unions followed. These outbursts prevented a scheduled visit to Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and precipitated the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, but not before the treaty was passed by default on June 19, when the House of Councillors failed to vote on the issue within the required thirty days after lower house approval.33
Under the treaty, both parties assumed an obligation to assist each other in case of armed attack on territories under Japanese administration. (It was understood, however, that Japan could not come to the defense of the United States because it was constitutionally forbidden to send armed forces overseas (Article 9). In particular, the constitution forbids the maintenance of "land, sea, and air forces." It also expresses the Japanese people's renunciation of "the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes". Accordingly, the Japanese find it difficult to send their "self-defense" forces overseas, even for peace-keeping purposes.) The scope of the new treaty did not extend to the Ryukyu Islands, but an appended minute made clear that in case of an armed attack on the islands, both governments would consult and take appropriate action. Notes accompanying the treaty provided for prior consultation between the two governments before any major change occurred in the deployment of United States troops or equipment in Japan. Unlike the 1952 security pact, the new treaty provided for a ten-year term, after which it could be revoked upon one year's notice by either party. The treaty included general provisions on the further development of international cooperation and on improved future economic cooperation.
Both countries worked closely to fulfill the United States promise, under Article 3 of the peace treaty, to return all Japanese territories acquired by the United States in war. In June 1968, the United States returned the Bonin Islands (including Iwo Jima) to Japanese administration control. In 1969, the Okinawa reversion issue and Japan's security ties with the United States became the focal points of partisan political campaigns. The situation calmed considerably when Prime Minister Sato Eisaku visited Washington in November 1969, and in a joint communiqué signed by him and President Richard M. Nixon, announced the United States agreement to return Okinawa to Japan in 1972. In June 1971, after eighteen months of negotiations, the two countries signed an agreement providing for the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972.3435
The Japanese government's firm and voluntary endorsement of the security treaty and the settlement of the Okinawa reversion question meant that two major political issues in Japan–United States relations were eliminated. But new issues arose. In July 1971, the Japanese government was surprised by Nixon's dramatic announcement of his forthcoming visit to the People's Republic of China. Many Japanese were chagrined by the failure of the United States to consult in advance with Japan before making such a fundamental change in foreign policy. The following month, the government was again surprised to learn that, without prior consultation, the United States had imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports, a decision certain to hinder Japan's exports to the United States. Relations between Tokyo and Washington were further strained by the monetary crisis involving the December 1971 revaluation of the Japanese yen.
These events of 1971 marked the beginning of a new stage in relations, a period of adjustment to a changing world situation that was not without episodes of strain in both political and economic spheres, although the basic relationship remained close. The political issues between the two countries were essentially security-related and derived from efforts by the United States to induce Japan to contribute more to its own defense and to regional security. The economic issues tended to stem from the ever-widening United States trade and payments deficits with Japan, which began in 1965 when Japan reversed its imbalance in trade with the United States and, for the first time, achieved an export surplus.36
Heavy American military spending in the Korean War (1950–53) and the Vietnam War (1965–73) provided a major stimulus to the Japanese economy.37
The United States withdrawal from Indochina in 1975 and the end of the Vietnam War meant that the question of Japan's role in the security of East Asia and its contributions to its own defense became central topics in the dialogue between the two countries. United States dissatisfaction with Japanese defense efforts began to surface in 1975 when Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger publicly stigmatized Japan. The Japanese government, constrained by constitutional limitations and strongly pacifist public opinion, responded slowly to pressures for a more rapid buildup of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF). It steadily increased its budgetary outlays for those forces, however, and indicated its willingness to shoulder more of the cost of maintaining the United States military bases in Japan. In 1976 the United States and Japan formally established a subcommittee for defense cooperation, in the framework of a bilateral Security Consultative Committee provided for under the 1960 security treaty. This subcommittee, in turn, drew up new Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation, under which military planners of the two countries have conducted studies relating to joint military action in the event of an armed attack on Japan.3839
On the economic front, Japan sought to ease trade frictions by agreeing to Orderly Marketing Arrangements, which limited exports on products whose influx into the United States was creating political problems. In 1977 an Orderly Marketing Arrangement limiting Japanese color television exports to the United States was signed, following the pattern of an earlier disposition of the textile problem. Steel exports to the United States were also curtailed, but the problems continued as disputes flared over United States restrictions on Japanese development of nuclear fuel- reprocessing facilities, Japanese restrictions on certain agricultural imports, such as beef and oranges, and liberalization of capital investment and government procurement within Japan.
Under American pressure Japan worked toward a comprehensive security strategy with closer cooperation with the United States for a more reciprocal and autonomous basis. This policy was put to the test in November 1979, when radical Iranians seized the United States embassy in Tehran, taking sixty hostages. Japan reacted by condemning the action as a violation of international law. At the same time, Japanese trading firms and oil companies reportedly purchased Iranian oil that had become available when the United States banned oil imported from Iran. This action brought sharp criticism from the United States of Japanese government "insensitivity" for allowing the oil purchases and led to a Japanese apology and agreement to participate in sanctions against Iran in concert with other United States allies.
Following that incident, the Japanese government took greater care to support United States international policies designed to preserve stability and promote prosperity. Japan was prompt and effective in announcing and implementing sanctions against the Soviet Union following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In 1981, in response to United States requests, it accepted greater responsibility for defense of seas around Japan, pledged greater support for United States forces in Japan, and persisted with a steady buildup of the SDF.
A qualitatively new stage of Japan-United States cooperation in world affairs appeared to be reached in late 1982 with the election of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. Officials of the Ronald Reagan administration worked closely with their Japanese counterparts to develop a personal relationship between the two leaders based on their common security and international outlook. President Reagan and Prime Minister enjoyed a particularly close relationship. It was Nakasone that backed Reagan to deploy Pershing missiles in Europe at the 1983 9th G7 summit. Nakasone reassured United States leaders of Japan's determination against the Soviet threat, closely coordinated policies with the United States toward such Asian trouble spots as the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia, and worked cooperatively with the United States in developing China policy. The Japanese government welcomed the increase of United States forces in Japan and the western Pacific, continued the steady buildup of the SDF, and positioned Japan firmly on the side of the United States against the threat of Soviet international expansion. Japan continued to cooperate closely with United States policy in these areas following Nakasone's term of office, although the political leadership scandals in Japan in the late 1980s (i.e. the Recruit scandal) made it difficult for newly elected President George H. W. Bush to establish the same kind of close personal ties that marked the Reagan years.
A specific example of Japan's close cooperation with the United States included its quick response to the United States' call for greater host nation support from Japan following the rapid realignment of Japan-United States currencies in the mid-1980s. The currency realignment resulted in a rapid rise of United States costs in Japan, which the Japanese government, upon United States request, was willing to offset. Another set of examples was provided by Japan's willingness to respond to United States requests for foreign assistance to countries considered of strategic importance to the West. During the 1980s, United States officials voiced appreciation for Japan's "strategic aid" to countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jamaica. Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki's pledges of support for East European and Middle Eastern countries in 1990 fit the pattern of Japan's willingness to share greater responsibility for world stability. Another example of US-Japan cooperation is through energy cooperation. In 1983 a US-Japan working group, chaired by William Flynn Martin, produced the Reagan-Nakasone Joint Statement on Japan-United States Energy Cooperation.40 Other instances of energy relations is shown through the US-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement of 1987 which was an agreement concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy.41 Testimony by William Flynn Martin, US Deputy Secretary of Energy, outlined the highlights of the nuclear agreement, including the benefits to both countries.42
Despite complaints from some Japanese businesses and diplomats, the Japanese government remained in basic agreement with United States policy toward China and Indochina. The government held back from large-scale aid efforts until conditions in China and Indochina were seen as more compatible with Japanese and United States interests. Of course, there also were instances of limited Japanese cooperation. Japan's response to the United States decision to help to protect tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) was subject to mixed reviews. Some United States officials stressed the positive, noting that Japan was unable to send military forces because of constitutional reasons but compensated by supporting the construction of a navigation system in the Persian Gulf, providing greater host nation support for United States forces in Japan, and providing loans to Oman and Jordan. Japan's refusal to join even in a mine-sweeping effort in the Persian Gulf was an indication to some United States officials of Tokyo's unwillingness to cooperate with the United States in areas of sensitivity to Japanese leaders at home or abroad.
The main area of noncooperation with the United States in the 1980s was Japanese resistance to repeated United States efforts to get Japan to open its market more to foreign goods and to change other economic practices seen as adverse to United States economic interests. A common pattern was followed. The Japanese government was sensitive to political pressures from important domestic constituencies that would be hurt by greater openness. In general, these constituencies were of two types—those representing inefficient or "declining" producers, manufacturers, and distributors, who could not compete if faced with full foreign competition; and those up-and-coming industries that the Japanese government wished to protect from foreign competition until they could compete effectively on world markets. To deal with domestic pressures while trying to avoid a break with the United States, the Japanese government engaged in protracted negotiations. This tactic bought time for declining industries to restructure themselves and new industries to grow stronger. Agreements reached dealt with some aspects of the problems, but it was common for trade or economic issues to be dragged out in talks over several years, involving more than one market-opening agreement. Such agreements were sometimes vague and subject to conflicting interpretations in Japan and the United States.
Growing interdependence was accompanied by markedly changing circumstances at home and abroad that were widely seen to have created a crisis in Japan–United States relations in the late 1980s. United States government officials continued to emphasize the positive aspects of the relationship but warned that there was a need for "a new conceptual framework." The Wall Street Journal publicized a series of lengthy reports documenting changes in the relationship in the late 1980s and reviewing the considerable debate in Japan and the United States over whether a closely cooperative relationship was possible or appropriate for the 1990s. An authoritative review of popular and media opinion, published in 1990 by the Washington-based Commission on US-Japan Relations for the Twenty-first Century, was concerned with preserving a close Japan–United States relationship. It warned of a "new orthodoxy" of "suspicion, criticism and considerable self- justification," which it said was endangering the fabric of Japan- United States relations.
The relative economic power of Japan and the United States was undergoing sweeping change, especially in the 1980s. This change went well beyond the implications of the United States trade deficit with Japan, which had remained between US$40 billion and US$48 billion annually since the mid-1980s. The persisting United States trade and budget deficits of the early 1980s led to a series of decisions in the middle of the decade that brought a major realignment of the value of Japanese and United States currencies. The stronger Japanese currency gave Japan the ability to purchase more United States goods and to make important investments in the United States. By the late 1980s, Japan was the main international creditor.
Japan's growing investment in the United States—it was the second largest investor after Britain—led to complaints from some American constituencies. Moreover, Japanese industry seemed well positioned to use its economic power to invest in the high-technology products in which United States manufacturers were still leaders. The United States's ability to compete under these circumstances was seen by many Japanese and Americans as hampered by heavy personal, government, and business debt and a low savings rate.
In the late 1980s, the breakup of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the growing preoccupation of Soviet leaders with massive internal political and economic difficulties forced the Japanese and United States governments to reassess their longstanding alliance against the Soviet threat. Officials of both nations had tended to characterize the security alliance as the linchpin of the relationship, which should have priority over economic and other disputes. Some Japanese and United States officials and commentators continued to emphasize the common dangers to Japan- United States interests posed by the continued strong Soviet military presence in Asia. They stressed that until Moscow followed its moderation in Europe with major demobilization and reductions in its forces positioned against the United States and Japan in the Pacific, Washington and Tokyo needed to remain militarily prepared and vigilant.
Increasingly, however, other perceived benefits of close Japan- United States security ties were emphasized. The alliance was seen as deterring other potentially disruptive forces in East Asia, notably the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Ironically, some United States officials noted that the alliance helped keep Japan's potential military power in check and under the supervision of the United States.
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Japan–United States relations were more uncertain in the early 1990s than at any time since World War II. As long-standing military allies and increasingly interdependent economic partners, Japan and the United States cooperated closely to build a strong, multifaceted relationship based on democratic values and interests in world stability and development. Japan–United States relations improved a lot between 1970 and 1980, as the two societies and economies became increasingly intertwined. In 1990 their combined gross national product (GNP) totaled about one third of the world's GNP. Japan received about 11 percent of United States exports (a larger share than any other country except Canada), and the United States bought about 34 percent of Japan's exports. Japan had US$148 billion in direct investment in the United States in 1991, while the United States had more than US$17 billion invested in Japan. Some US$100 billion in United States government securities held by institutions in Japan helped finance much of the United States budget deficit. Economic exchanges were reinforced by a variety of scientific, technical, tourist, and cultural exchanges. Each society continued to see the other as its main ally in Asia and the Pacific. Certain developments in the late 1980s damaged bilateral relations. Nevertheless, public opinion surveys continued to reveal that substantial majorities of Japanese and Americans believed that the bilateral relationship was vital to both countries.
The post–Cold War environment strengthened the relative importance of economic prowess over military power as the major source of world influence in the early 1990s. This shift affected the perceived relative standing of Japan, the United States, and other powers. Increasingly, Japan was expected to shoulder international aid and economic responsibilities that in the past were discharged by the United States and other Western countries.
The declining Soviet threat, the rising power of the Japanese economy, increasingly close United States interaction (and related disputes) with Japan, and other factors led by 1990 to a decided shift in United States opinion about Japan and to less marked but nonetheless notable shifts in Japanese opinion. In the United States, this shift was reflected in questions about which was the more serious, the military threat from the Soviet Union or the economic challenge from Japan. In a series of polls in 1989 and 1990, most respondents considered the challenge from Japan the more serious. Similarly, poll data from early 1990 showed that most Japanese considered negative United States attitudes toward Japan a reflection of United States anger at "America's slipping economic position." Meanwhile, Japanese opinion was showing greater confidence in Japan's ability to handle its own affairs without constant reference—as in the past—to the United States. Japan's belief in United States reliability as a world leader also lessened.
In both countries, new or "revisionist" views of the Japan- United States relationship were promoted. In Japan some commentators argued that the United States was weak, dependent on Japan, and unable to come to terms with world economic competition. They urged Japan to strike out on a more independent course. In the United States, prominent commentators warned of a Japanese economic juggernaut, out of control of the Japanese government, which needed to be "contained" by the United States.
At the same time, it was easy to overstate the changes in opinion in both countries. The Japanese still considered the United States positively as their closest friend, the principal guardian of their external security, their most important economic partner and market, and the exemplar of a life-style that had much to offer—and much to envy. Moreover, the vast majority of Americans still viewed Japan positively, had high respect for Japanese accomplishments, and supported the United States defense commitment to Japan.
With the end of the Cold War and changing administrations in Japan and the United States, Japan's relations with the United States entered a period of uncertainty and friction. In late 1993, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations and Japan's decision to allow some rice imports to make up for a reduced domestic crop provided a basis for further progress on trade issues, but the growing United States deficit in bilateral trade prompted Washington to demand that Tokyo set specific objectives for opening its markets to United States products. After fifteen months of sometimes contentious talks, on October 1, 1994, Japan and the United States concluded an agreement to open up three major Japanese markets to products from the United States. These were the Japanese insurance market and government purchases of telecommunications and medical equipment. The two sides failed to reach agreement on the import of American-made automobiles, automotive parts, and flat glass (used in automotive manufacturing and construction) to Japan but agreed to reach some resolution in thirty days.
In late May 1994, high-level negotiators from Japan and the United States, concerned that the trade frictions could jeopardize overall relations, reached an agreement to restart the framework talks at an early date. Despite the general failure of the framework talks, the two countries revealed in May that they would be engaging in joint high-technology research to develop ceramics used in high-density integrated circuits, composite carbon fiber materials used in manufacturing machinery, data collection using a crystal protein system, and technology to build environmentally friendly factories.
By the late 1990s and beyond the US-Japan relationship had been improved and strengthened. The major cause of friction in the relationship, trade disputes, became less problematic as China displaced Japan as the greatest perceived economic threat to the U.S. Meanwhile, though in the immediate post–Cold War period the security alliance suffered from a lack of a defined threat, the emergence of North Korea as a belligerent rogue state and China's economic and military expansion provided a purpose to strengthen the relationship. While the foreign policy of the administration of President George W. Bush put a strain on some of the United States' international relations, the alliance with Japan has become stronger, as evidenced in the Deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq and the joint development of anti-missile defense systems. The notion that Japan is becoming the "Great Britain of the Pacific", or the key and pivotal ally of the U.S. in the region, is frequently alluded to in international studies,43 but the extent to which this is true is still the subject of academic debate.
In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan came into power with a mandate calling for changes in the recently agreed security realignment plan and has opened a review into how the accord was reached, claiming the U.S. dictated the terms of the agreement, but United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that the U.S. Congress was unwilling to pay for any changes.444546
Some U.S. officials worry that the government led by the Democratic Party of Japan may be considering a policy shift away from the United States and toward a more independent foreign policy.46 In 2013 China and Russia held joint naval drills in what Chinese state media called an attempt to challenge the American-Japanese alliance.47
On September 19, 2013, Caroline Kennedy sat before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and responded to questions from both Republican and Democrat senators in relation to her potential appointment as the US ambassador to Japan. Kennedy, who had been nominated by President Obama in early 2013, explained that her focus would be military ties, trade, and student exchange if she was selected for the position.48
The United States has been Japan's largest economic partner, taking 31.5 percent of its exports, supplying 22.3 percent of its imports, and accounting for 45.9 percent of its direct investment abroad in 1990.citation needed As of 2004, the United States takes up 22.7% of Japanese exports, and supplies 14% of its imports (the slack having been picked up by China, which now provides 20.7%).citation needed
Japan's imports from the United States included both raw materials and manufactured goods. United States agricultural products were a leading import in 1990 (US$8.5 billion as measured by United States export statistics), made up of meat (US$1.5 billion), fish (US$1.8 million), grains (US$2.4 billion), and soybeans (US$8.8 billion). Imports of manufactured goods were mainly in the category of machinery and transportation equipment, rather than consumer goods.citation needed In 1990 Japan imported US$11.1 billion of machinery from the United States, of which computers and computer parts (US$3.9 billion) formed the largest single component. In the category of transportation equipment, Japan imported US$3.3 billion of aircraft and parts (automobiles and parts accounted for only US$1.8 billion).citation needed
Japan's exports to the United States were almost entirely manufactured goods.citation needed Automobiles were by far the largest single category, amounting to US$21.5 billion in 1990, or 24 percent of total Japanese exports to the United States.citation needed Automotive parts accounted for another US$10.7 billion. Other major items were office machinery (including computers), which totaled US$8.6 billion in 1990, telecommunications equipment (US$4.1 billion) and power-generating machinery (US$451 million).citation needed
From the mid-1960s, the trade balance has been in Japan's favor. According to Japanese data, its surplus with the United States grew from US$380 million in 1970 to nearly US$48 billion in 1988, declining to approximately US$38 billion in 1990.citation needed United States data on the trade relationship (which differ slightly because each nation includes transportation costs on the import side but not the export side) also show a rapid deterioration of the imbalance in the 1980s, from a Japanese surplus of US$10 billion in 1980 to one of US$60 billion in 1987, with an improvement to one of US$37.7 billion in 1990.citation needed
The general deterioration, and the very modest improvement in the trade balance after the yen rose in value after 1985, contributed greatly to strained economic relations.citation needed The United States had pressured Japan to open its markets since the early 1960s, but the intensity of the pressure increased through the 1970s and 1980s.citation needed
Tensions were exacerbated by issues specific to particular industries perhaps more than by the trade imbalance in general. Beginning with textiles in the 1950s, a number of Japanese exports to the United States were subject to opposition from United States industry.citation needed These complaints generally alleged unfair trading practices, such as dumping (selling at a lower cost than at home, or selling below the cost of production) and patent infringement. The result of negotiations was often Japan's agreement "voluntarily" to restrain exports to the United States. Such agreements applied to a number of products, including color television sets in the late 1970s and automobiles in the 1980s.citation needed
During the 1970s and 1980s, United States administrations had favored an issue-by-issue approach in negotiating such economic disputes with Japan. This approach ostensibly limited the areas of dispute.citation needed But it resulted in widespread negative publicity, at a time when changing economic and security circumstances were causing both countries to reevaluate the relationship.citation needed Notable outpourings of United States congressional and media rhetoric critical of Japan accompanied the disclosure in 1987 that Toshiba had illegally sold sophisticated machinery of United States origin to the Soviet Union, which reportedly allowed Moscow to make submarines quiet enough to avoid United States detection, and the United States congressional debate in 1989 over the Japan-United States agreement to develop a new fighter aircraft—the FSX—for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.4950
Some innovative approaches emerged in the 1980s as United States companies strove to achieve greater access to Japanese markets.citation needed MOSS negotiations in 1985 addressed access problems related to four industries: forest products, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, electronics, and telecommunications equipment and services.citation needed
Problems of access to Japanese markets were among the motivations for the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which included a provision calling on the president to identify unfair trading partners of the United States and to specify products for negotiation with these countries.citation needed In the spring of 1989, Japan was named as an unfair trading partner under this provision and three areas—forest products, telecommunications satellites, and supercomputers—were selected for negotiations. This action exemplified the continuing mood of dissatisfaction over access to Japanese markets at the end of the decade.citation needed Nevertheless, Japan and the U.S. settled their disputes to Japan's advantage.citation needed
At the same time, the United States initiated broad talks concerning the structural factors inhibiting manufactured imports in Japan, in the Structural Impediments Initiative.citation needed These talks addressed such areas as the law restraining the growth of large discount store chains in Japan, weak antitrust law enforcement, land taxation that encouraged inefficient farming, and high real estate prices.citation needed Japan was still able to fulfill many of interests that further expanded its economy.citation needed
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A new approach was added in 1989. The so-called Structural Impediments Initiative was a series of talks designed to deal with domestic structural problems limiting trade on both sides. After several rounds of often contentious talks, agreements were reached in April and July 1990 that promised major changes in such sensitive areas as Japanese retailing practices, land use, and investment in public works. The United States pledged to deal more effectively with its budget deficit and to increase domestic savings. United States supporters saw the Structural Impediments Initiative talks as addressing fundamental causes of Japan-United States economic friction. Skeptics pointed to them as ways for officials to buy time and avoid an acute crisis in Japan–United States relations. The Bill Clinton administration decided to end the Structural Impediments Initiative in the summer of 1993 as a framework for dealing with United States-Japan bilateral relations.
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As elsewhere, Japan's direct investment in the United States expanded rapidly and is an important new dimension in the countries' relationship. The total value of cumulative investments of this kind was US$8.7 billion in 1980. By 1990 it had grown to US$83.1 billion. United States data identified Japan as the second largest investor in the United States; it had about half the value of investments of Britain, but more than those of the Netherlands, Canada, or West Germany. Much of Japan's investment in the United States in the late 1980s was in the commercial sector, providing the basis for distribution and sale of Japanese exports to the United States. Wholesale and retail distribution accounted for 32.2 percent of all Japanese investments in the United States in 1990, while manufacturing accounted for 20.6 percent. Real estate became a popular investment during the 1980s, with cumulative investments rising to US$15.2 billion by 1988, or 18.4 percent of total direct investment in the United States.
The US and Japan find themselves in fundamentally different situations regarding energy and energy security. Cooperation in energy has moved from conflict (the embargo of Japanese oil was the trigger that launched the Pearl Harbor attack) to cooperation with two significant agreements being signed during the 1980s: the Reagan-Nakasone Energy Cooperation Agreement and the US-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement of 1987 (allowing the Japanese to reprocess nuclear fuels).51
Further cooperation occurred during the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami with US troops aiding the victims of the disaster zone and US scientists from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Energy advising on the response to the nuclear incident at Fukushima. In 2013 the Department of Energy allowed the export of American natural gas to Japan.52
The 1952 Mutual Security Assistance Pact provided the initial basis for the nation's security relations with the United States. The pact was replaced in 1960 by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which declares that both nations will maintain and develop their capacities to resist armed attack in common and that each recognizes that an armed attack on either one in territories administered by Japan will be considered dangerous to the safety of the other. The Agreed Minutes to the treaty specified that the Japanese government must be consulted prior to major changes in United States force deployment in Japan or to the use of Japanese bases for combat operations other than in defense of Japan itself. However, Japan was relieved by its constitutional prohibition of participating in external military operations from any obligation to defend the United States if it were attacked outside of Japanese territories. In 1990 the Japanese government expressed its intention to continue to rely on the treaty's arrangements to guarantee national security.53
The Agreed Minutes under Article 6 of the 1960 treaty contain a status-of-forces agreement on the stationing of United States forces in Japan, with specifics on the provision of facilities and areas for their use and on the administration of Japanese citizens employed in the facilities. Also covered are the limits of the two countries' jurisdictions over crimes committed in Japan by United States military personnel.
The Mutual Security Assistance Pact of 1952 initially involved a military aid program that provided for Japan's acquisition of funds, matériel, and services for the nation's essential defense. Although Japan no longer received any aid from the United States by the 1960s, the agreement continued to serve as the basis for purchase and licensing agreements ensuring interoperability of the two nations' weapons and for the release of classified data to Japan, including both international intelligence reports and classified technical information.
Okinawa is the site of major American military bases that have caused problems, as national anti-American elements and locals have protested their presence for decades. In secret negotiations that began in 1969 Washington sought unrestricted use of its bases for possible conventional combat operations in Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam, as well as the emergency re-entry and transit rights of nuclear weapons. However anti-nuclear sentiment was strong in Japan and the government wanted the U.S. to remove all nuclear weapons from Okinawa. In the end, the United States and Japan agreed to maintain bases that would allow the continuation of American deterrent capabilities in East Asia. In 1972 the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, reverted to Japanese control and the provisions of the 1960 security treaty were extended to cover them. The United States retained the right to station forces on these islands.54
Military relations improved after the mid-1970s. In 1960 the Security Consultative Committee, with representatives from both countries, was set up under the 1960 security treaty to discuss and coordinate security matters concerning both nations. In 1976 a subcommittee of that body prepared the Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation that were approved by the full committee in 1978 and later approved by the National Defense Council and cabinet. The guidelines authorized unprecedented activities in joint defense planning, response to an armed attack on Japan, and cooperation on situations in Asia and the Pacific region that could affect Japan's security.
A dispute that had boiled since 1996 regarding a base with 18,000 U.S. Marines was resolved in late 2013. Agreement was reached to move the Marine Corps’ Air Station Futenma to a remote areas of Okinawa where it will cause less friction.55
- Foreign relations of Japan
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- Operation Tomodachi
- Obama: US will stand by longtime ally Japan
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