|The Rotterdam Blitz|
|Part of Battle of the Netherlands|
Rotterdam's city centre after the bombing. The heavily damaged (now restored) St. Lawrence church stands out as the only remaining building reminiscent of Rotterdam's medieval architecture.
|Commanders and leaders|
Marine Luchvaartdienst (MLD)
|less than 70 aircraft.1||~80 aircraft directly involved
~700 involved in concurrent operations
|Casualties and losses|
|884 civilians killed
LVA and MLD virtually destroyed.2
The Rotterdam Blitz was the aerial bombardment of Rotterdam by the Luftwaffe (German air force) on 14 May 1940, during the German invasion of the Netherlands in World War II. The objective was to support the German troops fighting in the city, break Dutch resistance and force the Dutch to surrender. Even though preceding negotiations resulted in a ceasefire, the bombardment took place nonetheless, in conditions which remain controversial, and destroyed almost the entire historic city centre, killing nearly nine hundred civilians and leaving 30,000 people homeless.
The psychological and physical success of the raid, from the German perspective, led the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKW) to threaten to destroy the city of Utrecht if the Dutch Government did not surrender. The Dutch capitulated early the next morning.3
The Netherlands during the Second World War was strategically lodged between Great Britain and Germany, making it an ideal prospective German air and naval "base" during Operation Sea Lion, the planned invasion of the British Isles that was to follow the forthcoming aerial Battle of Britain. It had firmly opted for neutrality throughout the First World War and had planned to do the same for the Second World War. It most notably refused to accept armaments from France, making the case that they wanted no association with either side. While armament production was slightly increased after the invasion of Denmark in April 1940, the Netherlands possessed 35 modern wheeled armoured fighting vehicle, no tracked armoured fighting vehicles, 135 aircraft and 280,000 soldiers,4 while Germany had 159 tanks,5 1,200 modern aircraft,citation needed and around 150,000 soldiers at their disposal [for the Dutch theatre only].5
With a significant military advantage, the Germans intended to expedite the conquest of the country by first taking control of key military and strategic targets, such as airfields, bridges and roads and then using these to take over control of the remainder of the country. An invasion of the Netherlands was first made reference to on 9 October 1939, when Hitler ordered that "Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. This attack must be carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible".6 Preparation was started when Hitler ordered German army officers to capture Dutch army uniforms and use them to gain inside information on Dutch defence tactics.7
The Wehrmacht finally attacked the Netherlands in the early hours of 10 May 1940. The attack started with the Luftwaffe crossing through Dutch airspace, giving the impression that Britain was the ultimate target. Instead, the aircraft turned around over the North Sea and returned to attack from the west, dropping paratroopers at Valkenburg and Ockenburg airfields, near the Dutch seat of government and the Royal Palace in The Hague, starting the Battle for the Hague. While Germany had planned to take over swiftly using this tactic, the Dutch halted the advance at the core region of Fortress Holland, slowing down the German invasion.
The situation in Rotterdam on the morning of 13 May 1940 was a stalemate as it had been over the past three days. Dutch garrison forces under Colonel Scharroo held the north bank of the Nieuwe Maas river, which runs through the city and prevented the Germans from crossing; German forces included airlanding and airborne forces of General Student and newly arrived ground forces under General Schmidt, based on the 9th Panzer Division and the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, a motorized SS regiment.
A Dutch counterattack led by a Dutch marine company had failed to recapture the Willemsbrug traffic bridge,89 the key crossing. Several efforts by the Dutch Army Aviation Brigade to destroy the bridge also failed.10
On the Morning of 14 May, Hitler issued his "Weisung" Nr. 11. Concerning the Dutch theatre of operations he says the following:
The resistance capability of the Dutch army has proved to be stronger than expected. Political as well as military reasons demand that this resistance is broken as soon as possible. It is the task of the army to capture the Fortress Holland by committing enough forces from the south, combined with an attack on the east front. In addition to that the air force must, while weakening the forces that up till now have supported the 6th Army, facilitate the rapid fall of the Fortress Holland.citation needed
General Schmidt had planned a combined assault the next day, 14 May, using tanks of the 9th Panzer supported by flame throwers, SS troops and combat engineers.11121314 The airlanding troops were to make an amphibious crossing of the river upstream and then a flank attack through the Kralingen district.1516 The attack was to be preceded by artillery bombardment, while Gen. Schmidt had requested the support of the Luftwaffe in the form of a Gruppe (about 25 aircraft) of Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers, specifically for a precision raid.171819
Schmidt's request for air support reached Berlin, staff of Luftflotte 2. Instead of precision bombers, Schmidt got carpet bombing by Heinkel He 111 bombers besides a Gruppe of Stuka's focussing on some strategic targets.20
Schmidt used the threat of destruction of the city to attempt to force Colonel Scharroo to surrender the city. Rotterdam, the largest industrial target in the Netherlands and of major strategic importance to the Germans, was to be bombed. Scharroo refused and stretched out negotiations. The start of the air raid had been set for 13:20 [Dutch time, MET – 1 hr 40].212223
Schmidt postponed a second ultimatum to 16:20.2425 However, just as the Dutch negotiator was crossing the Willemsbrug to relay this information, the drone of bombers was heard: a total of 90 bombers from Kampfgeschwader 54 were sent over the city.26
Student radioed to postpone the planned attack. When the message reached KG 54's command post, the Kommodore, Oberst Walter Lackner, was already approaching Rotterdam and his aircraft had reeled in their long-range aerials. Haze and smoke obscured the target; to ensure that Dutch defences were hit Lackner brought his formation down to 2,300 ft (700 m).27 German forces on the noordereiland fired flares28 to prevent friendly fire — after three aircraft of the southern formation had already unloaded, the remaining 24 from the southern bomber formation under Oberstleutnant Otto Höhne aborted their attack. The larger formation came from the north-east, out of position to spot red flares launched from the south side of the city, and proceeded with their attack. Fifty-four He 111s dropped low to release 97 tonnes (213,848 lb) of bombs, mostly in the heart of the city.29
Why the formation had not received the abort order sooner remains controversial. Oberst Lackner of the largest formation claimed that his crews were unable to spot red flares due to bad visibility caused by humidity and dense smoke of burning constructions and subsequently needed to decrease altitude to 2,000 feet.30 But the red flare, which Lackner failed to see, might have also been used by the Germans to show their location in the city to avoid friendly fire. An official German form designated red as the colour for that purpose.31
In total, 1,150 50-kilogram (110 lb) and 158 250-kilogram (550 lb) bombs were dropped, mainly in the residential areas of Kralingen and the medieval city centre. Most of these hit and ignited buildings, resulting in uncontrollable fires that worsened the following days when the wind grew fiercer and the fires emerged into a firestorm.29 Hooton states that bombs ignited vegetable oil tanks on the dockside, which caused fires that spread into the city centre, causing massive devastation.27 Although exact numbers are not known, nearly 1,000 people were killed and 85,000 made homeless.32 Around 2.6 square kilometres (1.0 sq mi) of the city was almost levelled. 24,978 homes, 24 churches, 2,320 stores, 775 warehouses and 62 schools were destroyed.33 Schmidt sent a conciliatory message to the Dutch commander General Winkelman, who surrendered shortly afterwards, at Rijsoord, a village southeast of Rotterdam.27 The school where the Dutch signed their surrender was later turned into a small museum.
The Dutch military had no effective means of stopping the bombers (the Dutch Air Force had practically ceased to exist and its anti-aircraft guns had been moved to The Hague), so when another similar ultimatum was given in which the Germans threatened to bomb the city of Utrecht, the Dutch government decided to capitulate rather than risk the destruction of another city.3435 Western news agencies grossly exaggerated the event for propaganda purposes, portraying Rotterdam as a city mercilessly destroyed by terror bombing without regard to civilian life, with 30,000 dead lying under the ruins.36 The number of casualties 'lying under the ruins' was relatively small, because thousands of civilians had fled to safer parts of Rotterdam, or to other cities, during the previous four days of bombing and warfare.37 German weekly Die Mühle (The Windmill) stated that the Dutch government was to blame for turning Rotterdam into a fortress, despite multiple summons to evacuate. It also claimed that the old city was ignited by Dutch bombs and incendiary devices.38
The United Kingdom had had a policy of only bombing military targets and infrastructure such as ports and railways which were of military importance.39 While it was acknowledged that bombing of Germany would cause civilian casualties, the British government renounced the deliberate bombing of civilian property, outside combat zones (which after the fall of Poland, meant German areas east of the Rhine) as a military tactic.40 This policy was abandoned on 15 May 1940, one day after the Rotterdam Blitz, when the RAF was directed to attack targets in the Ruhr, including oil plants and other civilian industrial targets which aided the German war effort, such as blast furnaces that at night were self-illuminating. The first RAF raid on the interior of Germany took place on the night of 15/16 May 1940.41
When the invasion of Holland took place I was recalled from leave and went on my first operation on 15th May 1940 against mainland Germany. Our target was Dortmund and on the way back we were routed via Rotterdam. The German Air Force had bombed Rotterdam the day before and it was still in flames. I realised then only too well that the phoney war was over and that this was for real. By that time the fire services had extinguished a number of fires, but they were still dotted around the whole city. This was the first time I'd ever seen devastation by fires on this scale. We went right over the southern outskirts of Rotterdam at about 6,000 or 7,000 feet, and you could actually smell the smoke from the fires burning on the ground. I was shocked seeing a city in flames like that. Devastation on a scale I had never experienced.—Air Commodore, Wilf Burnett.42
- Hooton 2007, p. 49.
- Hooton 2007, p. 79.
- Hooton 2007, p. 52.
- Goossens 2011, Dutch army unit organisation.
- Goossens 2011, German strategy 10 May 1940: German invasion army strength
- The Nizkor Project 1991, p. 766.
- Foot 1990, p. page needed.
- Brongers 2004, (ONR Part III), p. 83
- Amersfoort 2005, p. 364.
- Brongers 2004, (ONR Part I), pp. 242,243
- Brongers 2004, (ONR Part III), pp. 204, 205
- Amersfoort 2005, p. 367.
- Pauw 2006, p. 75.
- Götzel 1980, p. 145.
- Götzel 1980, p. page needed.
- Kriegstagebuch, KTB IR.16, 22.ID BA/MA
- Brongers 2004, (ONR Part III), p. 201
- Amersfoort 2005, p. 368.
- Götzel 1980, pp. 146, 147.
- Goossens 2011, Rotterdam: Introduction - a recapitulation; Brongers 2004, (ONR Part III), p. 232; Amersfoort 2005, pp. 368,369;Pauw 2006, p. 74; Götzel 1980, pp. 146–151; Lackner 1954, p. page needed
- Brongers 2004, (ONR Part III), p. 235
- Amersfoort 2005, p. 369.
- Götzel 1980, pp. 149, 150.
- Brongers 2004, (ONR Part III), p. 227
- Amersfoort 2005, p. 370.
- Brongers 2004, (ONR Part III), p. 232; Lackner 1954, p. page needed;Amersfoort 2005, p. 369; Pauw 2006, p. 84; Speidel 1958, p. page needed
- Hooton 1994, p. 249.
- Jong 1940, p. 352.
- Goossens 2011, May 14: Rotterdam; Amersfoort 2005, p. 370; Pauw 2006, p. 84; Hooton 1994, p. 249; Brongers 2004, (ONR Part III), p. 236; Götzel 1980, p. 151; Lackner 1954, p. page needed; Wagenaa 1970, pp. 307–308
- Lackner 1954, p. page needed.
- L. Elfferich, Rotterdam werd verraden. Abcoude: Uniepers, 1990. p. 270
- Nederlands Omroep Stichting (NOS) 2008.
- Roep & Loerakker 1999, p. 42 Square 2.
- Brongers 2004, (ONR Part III), p. 263.
- Amersfoort 2005, p. 183.
- Hinchcliffe 2000, p. 43broken citation
- Wagenaa 1970, pp. 75-303.
- Die Mühle, no.22, 31 May 1940, Moritz Schäfer Verlag, Leipzig
- Hastings 1999, pp. 54–56.
- Grayling 2006, p. 24.
- Taylor 2005, Chapter "Call Me Meier", p. 111.
- Burnett 2008.
- Amersfoort, H; et al (2005), Mei 1940 - Strijd op Nederlands grondgebied (in Dutch), SDU, ISBN 90-12-08959-X
- Brongers, E.H. (2004), Opmars naar Rotterdam (in Dutch), Aspect, ISBN 90-5911-269-5
- Burnett, Wilf (7 October 2008), "Flying over Rotterdam", Early Days, Personal Stories, Bomber Command Association, retrieved July 2013
- Foot (1990), Holland at war against Hitler: Anglo-Dutch relations, 1940-1945.full citation needed
- Goossens, Allert (2011), Welcome, website of 1998-2009 Stichting Kennispunt Mei 1940, retrieved January 2013
- Götzel, H (1980), Generaloberst Kurt Student und seine Fallschirmjäger (in German), Podzun-Pallas Verlag, ISBN 3-7909-0131-8 OCLC 7863989
- Grayling, A.C. (2006), Among the Dead Cities, New York: Walker Publishing Company Inc, ISBN 0-8027-1471-4
- Hastings, Max (1999), Bomber Command, London: Pan Books, ISBN 978-0-330-39204-4
- Hinchcliffe, Peter (1996), The other battle : Luftwaffe night aces versus Bomber Command, Airlife Publishing isbn=978-1-85310-547-0
- Hooton, Edward (1994), Phoenix Triumphant; The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe, London: Arms & Armour Press, ISBN 1-86019-964-X
- Hooton, Edward (2007), Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West, London: Chervron/Ian Allan, ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6
- Jong, dr. L de (3 May 1940), Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog deel (in Dutch), p. 352
- Lackner, a.D. (Gen-Lt) (1953), Bericht Einsatz des KG.54 auf Rotterdam (in German), Freiburg: Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv
- Nederlands Omroep Stichting (NOS) (10 December 2008), Veel meer gewonden in mei 1940. (in Dutch)
- Pauw, J.L. van der (2006), Rotterdam in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (in Dutch), Uitgeverij Boom, ISBN 90-8506-160-1
- The Nizkor Project (1991), "Chapter IX: Aggression Against Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg (Part 3 of 6).", Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression I, pp. 766–768
- Roep, Thom; Loerakker, Co (1999), Van Nul to Nu Deel 3-De vaderlandse geschiedenis van 1815 tot 1940 (in Dutch), p. 42 square 2, ISBN 90-5425-098-4
- Speidel, Wilhelm (General der Flieger) (1958), "Chief of Staff Luftflotte 2 Western theatre January–October 1940 (K113-107-152)", The campaign in Western-Europe 1939-1940, Washington archives
- Taylor, Frederick (2005), Dresden: Tuesday, 13 February 1945, London: Bloomsbury, ISBN 0-7475-7084-1
- Wagenaar, Aad (1970), Rotterdam mei '40: De slag, de bommen, de brand (in Dutch), Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, ISBN 90-204-1961-7
- ?. Kriegstagebuch IR.16, May 1940broken citation
- Google Earth overlay of the area destroyed in the Blitz
- Rotterdam Blitz with timeline
- Spaight. James M. "Bombing Vindicated" G. Bles, 1944. OCLC 1201928 (Spaight was Principal Assistant Secretary of the Air Ministry (U.K))
- Pictures of Rotterdam after the Blitz
- Pictures of the 2007 and 2008 commemoration by Mothership art producers